

**A QUALITATIVE REVIEW OF TARGETING
METHODOLOGIES IN THE KENYA HUNGER SAFETY NET
PROGRAMME (HSNP)**

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CBT	Community-based Targeting
CBTD	Community-based Targeting and Distribution
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DR	Dependency Ratio
DGSDO	District Gender and Social Development Officer
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HSNP	Hunger Safety Net Programme
MIS	Management Information System
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OPCT	Older Person's Cash Transfer
OPM	Oxford Policy Management Ltd
OVC-CT	OVC Cash Transfer
QCA	Qualitative comparative analysis
SAGE	Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment
SP	Social Protection
SPR	Social Protection Rights (Component)
TORs	Terms of Reference
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) is piloting the use of long term predictable cash transfers as a means of addressing chronic hunger in the North-East region of Kenya. The HSNP is a two phased programme. Phase 1 – from 2008-12 – is a pilot during which three types of targeting mechanisms have been tested: Community Based Targeting, Dependency Ratio and a Social Pension. The aim during Phase 1 has been to assess which targeting mechanism is most appropriate for reaching poor people, taking into account the characteristics of the population and the region. When assessing the targeting methodologies, it is important to bear in mind that most people in the HSNP Districts of Wajir, Marsabit, Mandera and Turkana are poor, when compared to the national poverty line.

This paper sets out the results of a qualitative review of HSNP targeting methodologies. The review methodology involved interviews – one-on-one and focus groups – with a wide range of stakeholders in the HSNP Districts, including beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, programme staff, leaders, government staff and representatives of other organisations. Programme documentation was also reviewed. This paper complements a quantitative survey of targeting undertaken by Oxford Policy Management (OPM).

Effectiveness of Targeting Methodologies

Community Based Targeting (CBT) appears relatively effective in reaching those recognized by communities as being the poorest and most vulnerable. However, among the rest of the poor, its selection appears to be more arbitrary and it acts, essentially, as a rationing mechanism, selecting some poor households from among a broader number of poor who, due to a quota system, are excluded. The Dependency Ratio (DR) mechanism has the highest coverage and, as a result, includes a large number of poor households, but also some that are less poor. Poor households with a low dependency ratio are excluded. The Social Pension is effective in reaching poor households with older residents, but is ineffective in reaching other households, except indirectly through sharing mechanisms.

Explanations for Effectiveness of Targeting Methodologies

The success of the CBT in identifying the poorest and most vulnerable is mainly due to the extent and quality of facilitation by the Administration component of HSNP. However, the investment of human resources in this facilitation is high and it is doubtful that the same level of success could be maintained if there was a decrease in the number or quality of the facilitators. It is also relatively simple for community members to identify the most destitute households. CBT finds it more challenging to identify the most deserving poor households that are not destitute, since such households comprise the majority of most communities and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. There are concerns that households that do not participate in meetings are less likely to be included, unless they are clearly destitute. CBT is unresponsive to changes in poverty over time, given that re-targeting has not been undertaken. Consequently, there could be a progressive degradation in targeting accuracy over time, in particular if re-targeting is infrequent.

The main reason for the success of the Dependency Ratio mechanism is its high coverage rate. It necessarily has to include a large number of poor households. However, given that the dependency ratio does not necessarily correlate with poverty, some poor households with low dependency ratios are excluded. Similarly, better-off households with higher dependency ratios are also included. The Dependency Ratio mechanism is not particularly effective in dealing with changing household structures given the absence of re-targeting.

The universal nature of the Social Pension means that it is effective in reaching poor households with older residents; if it were poverty targeted, its effectiveness would reduce significantly. However, as a trade-off, a small number of better-off older people and their households are included. In some sub-locations, though, a quota was inappropriately applied in the Social Pension, which reduced its effectiveness in reaching the poor. By its nature, the Social Pension cannot reach poor households without older persons. The one-off registration methodology used by the Social Pension has meant that some eligible older people missed registration and could not benefit from the programme. And,

there have been minor challenges with older people who have identity cards with a date of birth identifying them as younger than they really are.

The HSNP has not, however, as yet tested re-targeting, a significant weakness in design. It is likely that further challenges will arise during re-targeting – particularly with CBT and the Dependency Ratio methodology – as people will know how the mechanisms work and will be more able to manipulate them. And, in CBT, beneficiary households may be unwilling to be removed from the programme, which could encourage manipulative behaviour and potential social conflict. A major flaw in the design of the Social Pension was the decision not to use rolling registration. If it had, then re-targeting would not be required, assuming that an effective process for de-registering beneficiaries upon death is in place.

Registration of household members

Across all mechanisms, there has been no comprehensive registration of data on household composition and members onto the programme's electronic database. This is necessary for the good functioning of the Dependency Ratio mechanism. The non-collection of such data for the CBT means that the mechanism is afforded a lower standard of rigour than the other methodologies. As a result, it is difficult to monitor community decisions and provide good accountability from the community to those funding the programme. Information on household members is not needed for the Social Pension as it is an individual benefit. However, it could provide useful monitoring information.

Appeals against targeting processes

There is little evidence of the value of validation meetings, which are used in CBT to confirm community selection. People are unlikely to challenge publicly the inclusion of other households. There are also concerns that it is difficult for community members to appeal targeting decisions made using CBT. While they should be able to appeal on the basis of their poverty, a mechanism for doing this has not been developed. Appeals are less problematic with the Dependency Ratio mechanism and Social Pension since the rationale for decisions is clearer.

Human resource requirements

The Social Pension is the least labour intensive method while the Dependency Ratio is the most labour intensive. The Social Pension requires less staffing inputs for the simple reason that it is the simplest method and requires the least information. However, in some sub-locations a census methodology was unnecessarily employed, which increased staff requirements. CBT has relatively high human resource requirements due to the intensity of the facilitation of community meetings. However, if CBT were to collect information on household members – to improve its accountability – then human resource inputs would increase. The Dependency Ratio mechanism is the most labour intensive method, due to its need to collect data on all household members.

Perceptions of communities on the targeting methods

Community members seem relatively content with all three methods. CBT is accepted, due to its transparency and openness, in particular when compared to Community Based Targeting & Distribution (CBTD) – set up for food relief purposes – in which committees of elders make decisions. However, it is not known whether opinions will change following re-targeting. The Social Pension is popular as a transfer, as people recognise that the elderly are deserving of the transfer, and they would like to retain it. However, because it was presented as a programme for the poor, there is some discontent that poor households without older people have not been able to benefit from the HSNP. The Dependency Ratio did generate the most complaints, mainly because poor households with a low dependency ratio were excluded.

Opportunity costs

The main opportunity costs generated by the programme are with the CBT. People have to attend 4 to 5 meetings, many of which take at least a day. For example, in sub-locations in which 500 people attend meetings, this could mean that 2,500 potential working days are lost, although some may not

have been able to undertake particularly productive work. It does, though, place a particular burden on women and mothers with young children and disrupts domestic work.

Behavioural change

The Dependency Ratio mechanism has been associated with some behavioural change. As the mechanism was rolled out and communities understood the targeting methodology, there is some evidence that household composition was modified to increase the chances of being incorporated in the programme. There is minimal behavioural impact on communities as a result of the other two targeting mechanisms.

Way Forward: Phase 2

To minimise concerns in communities that will be subject to a change in targeting methodology during Phase 2, the following strategy is recommended:

- The next steps for HSNP should be fully explained to all stakeholders in each sub-location.
- Households to be removed from the programme should be given early notification and guaranteed an additional six months of benefits.
- All those on the Social Pension should remain on the programme permanently as they are unlikely to escape from poverty. Consideration could be given to migrating them over to the Government of Kenya's Older Persons Cash Transfer Programme (OPCT).

Staffing requirements: Phase 2

Currently, within the four Districts the programme employs 28 full-time staff for targeting, with additional part-time enumerators for census registration. In Phase 2, if CBT were to reach all Districts with re-targeting undertaken every 3 years, it is likely that 56 staff would be required. If further good practice were to be introduced into CBT, including registering all household members, then at least 72 staff would be required across the HSNP districts. As categorical targeting is much simpler, with rolling on-demand registration it should require less staff than currently, reducing numbers initially to 20 and then to 10. It may also be possible to transfer some responsibilities to government, as targeting would be relatively straightforward.

Targeting options: Phase 2

Three potential targeting options are suggested for Phase 2:

1. A general poverty safety net to target the poorest households, although a less effective form of CBT should be used, to reduce programme staffing costs.
2. Retain the Social Pension – although the age may have to be increased to comply with the OPCT criteria – and add in other vulnerable categories, such as widows, orphans, people with disabilities, etc. Targeting would be undertaken by programme staff.
3. As government social protection programmes expand – in particular the OVC-CT, OPCT and Disability Grant – HSNP could align to these programmes and be used as a means of developing good practice, although cash delivery would be kept separate from government. A residual safety net programme – using a simplified form of CBT – could be retained for the very poor, and be managed outside government.

1. INTRODUCTION

The broad aim of the Kenyan Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) is to reduce poverty among pastoralist peoples in northern Kenya. It began targeting communities at the end of 2008. The programme has been in a pilot phase and three targeting methodologies have been tested: Community Based Targeting (CBT), a Dependency Ratio methodology, and a Social Pension.

This report presents the findings of a study commissioned by DFID to assess the three targeting methodologies. A qualitative approach was used and the study complements a quantitative evaluation undertaken by OPM. The details of the research methodology are set out in Annex 1, in which the issues to be addressed and the proposed methodology are outlined. The methodology essentially involved interviews – both one-on-one and focus groups – with a wide range of stakeholders from Districts (see Annex 2 for a consultation list). These included beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, programme staff, leaders, government staff and representatives of other organisations. Programme documentation was also reviewed. The team did not have access to the quantitative evaluation.

The review was undertaken by four researchers between 29th April and 17th May. Three Districts were visited for around five days each: Turkana, Marsabit and Wajir. Andrea McPherson visited Marsabit, Chris Cosgrove visited Turkana, and both Andrea McPherson and Lisa Hannigan visited Wajir. The Project Officer from Mandera was interviewed but the District could not be visited due to security reasons. Stephen Kidd provided overall oversight of the programme. All four researchers met for two days in Nairobi to collate and discuss information and agree the results, before presenting a summary of the findings to a workshop of programme and donor representatives.

Overall, the report assesses the effectiveness of the targeting methodologies, the reasons behind their effectiveness, the costs of the three methodologies, mainly in terms of the human resources required, and perspectives of the communities on the three methodologies. A number of smaller issues set out in the terms of reference are also discussed, including variations in implementation across Districts, opportunity costs of the methodologies, behavioural change within communities, relations between programme components and with local structures, and variations between census and on-demand methods. The report concludes by proposing a means of transitioning to Phase 2 to minimize potential discontent in communities with any changes, assessing the potential human resource costs of different methodologies and recommends three potential options for Phase 2, based on the programme objective of reaching the poor but taking into account other considerations.

2. GENERAL ISSUES IMPACTING ON TARGETING

In assessing targeting in HSNP, a number of general issues need to be taken into account as they have an impact on all the targeting methodologies and should be considered when assessing future targeting options.

Northern Kenya is currently in a situation of significant flux. While there are still mobile populations, in recent years the sedentary population has been growing, which has led to rapid increases in the populations of specific sub-locations. Livelihoods are transforming – or being eroded – rapidly and HSNP needs to adapt to this reality. Northern Kenya is a particularly challenging region within which to implement a cash transfer programme, and the simpler the targeting methodology, the more likely it is to be successful in the long-term, in particular if it is to be handed over to government at some time in the future. HSNP has created an elaborate and human resource intensive structure for delivering its cash transfer that is unlikely to be replicable under a government system. It is essentially a NGO programme – using a bank for delivery of cash – and, at present, needs to be judged in that way.

According to the project log-frame, a key objective of HSNP is to reach the poorest people in Kenya. In reality, most of the population in HSNP districts – Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir¹ – would be considered poor by Kenyan standards. So, achieving targeting success – in terms of minimizing inclusion errors – is relatively simple. In a context when most of the population is poor, the main factor driving exclusion errors is coverage: the higher the coverage, the lower the exclusion errors, whichever targeting methodology is chosen. So, assessing targeting accuracy in northern Kenya against national poverty lines is not a particularly good test of the targeting effectiveness of particular methodologies. A more robust test of targeting accuracy would be to assess the effectiveness of the methodologies in reaching the poorest in the region and in excluding the richest (even if they are poor by national standards). But, a strong argument could be made to target almost all the population, given the high levels of poverty in the region.

This does, however, raise the question on why the different targeting methodologies had very different coverage rates, in terms of the proportion of households benefiting in a sub-location. This does not enable a fair assessment to be made of the different methodologies. The Dependency Ratio methodology ended up with the highest coverage, CBT with the next highest coverage – although, as Section 5 indicates, this did not always happen – and the Social Pension has had the lowest coverage. It is difficult to understand why coverage rates were not made more equal so as to make a fairer comparison. For example, it would not have been difficult to have used a more demanding – and complex – dependency ratio to reduce coverage to that of the CBT. And, in social pension areas, it should have been possible to extend the principle of testing categorical targeting by also targeting other categories that would have been associated with poverty, and which would be prioritised by communities, to raise the coverage to a level similar to CBT.

Furthermore, early on in the programme, staff realised that certain aspects of the targeting methodologies were not working well, or were not needed, yet they continued to be implemented. For example, it was evident that, in terms of gaining accurate data, on-demand targeting was inferior to census-based targeting in the context of the Dependency Ratio methodology (although it will have been cheaper).² And, similarly, it was clear that census-based targeting of the social pension was an unnecessary expense; most social pensions around the world use on-demand targeting. The continued use of less effective or unnecessary mechanisms makes more complicated the assessment of the operational effectiveness and human resource requirements of the various methodologies.

Importantly, it should not be assumed that cash transfers are necessarily the most appropriate long-term mechanism for poor families in the region. It is evident that specific types of individuals and households require social security, as they are unlikely to ever build resilient independent livelihoods.

¹ Under the new Constitution, these are now Counties and each includes a number of Districts.

² OPM argue that the programme could not change the use of on-demand and census based approaches as it was stipulated that it would be tested in the evaluation. However, once it was realised that a methodology was not appropriate, it seems strange that it could not be decided to just no longer evaluate this element of the programme. Ultimately, though, the problem goes down to the inclusion of the two methods in the original design for targeting methodologies for which they were inappropriate.

But, it may be more appropriate for those with labour capacity to be integrated into other long-term development programmes that enable them to be more productive, although they are likely to need some initial financial support while they make this transition. Care needs to be taken not to create dependency through CT programme interventions. No evidence was found of this happening yet in any of the Districts, although it was not specifically investigated as an issue. And, it is just as likely to be a problem arising from relief distribution.

HSNP is continuing to be implemented within a context of widespread humanitarian assistance in the region, mainly delivered as food aid. HSNP cash is, therefore, only one transfer for families among others. The original intention of HSNP was to replace humanitarian assistance and provide a more stable and predictable source of income for vulnerable families. Yet, this has not happened although it should be a priority in Phase two, and there should be further integration of the two types of support. However, the existence of food and other social transfers may have implications for community responses to HSNP. Given the normal sharing practices between kin, it may well be that communities are happy to distribute cash to some families and food to others and the variety of transfer options in the region may contribute to the relative calmness of non-beneficiaries of HSNP once they are excluded from the programme. There may be a very different reaction if HSNP ends up being the only source of transfer for poor families.

However, it is unlikely that HSNP will end up being the only cash transfer in the region. The panorama of social security is changing. The OVC Cash Transfer (OVC-CT) programme has extended nationally and has moved into northern Kenya. Agreements have been reached for the OVC-CT not to enter into districts where HSNP is working but the appropriateness of this arrangement should be re-assessed given that the programmes have different objectives. Further, the Government of Kenya has initiated an Older Person's Cash Transfer (OPCT) which is now functioning in ASAL Districts and clearly overlaps and is in conflict with the HSNP Social Pension targeting methodology. A Disability Grant is also likely to move into the area. These national programmes may grow – currently Kenya is debating whether to extend the OPCT to all older people who do not currently have a pension – which would create significant overlap with HSNP. Phase 2 of HSNP needs to assess carefully how its safety net should relate to these new government programmes, with the aim of strengthening them rather than inadvertently undermining them.³

³ An example was found of an old man who was subsequently excluded from the OPCT on the grounds that he was on a HSNP beneficiary list. He was however, not yet a receiving the transfer as he was in a M&E control location. There are clear ethical issues with this, as the man was left without a much-needed transfer.

3. DESCRIPTION OF TARGETING METHODOLOGIES

The three targeting methodologies were designed to be different in nature. A short summary of each is provided below

3.1 COMMUNITY BASED TARGETING (CBT)

In CBT, eligibility for the programme is on the basis of poverty. The poorest households are identified by 'the community' based on poverty criteria set at the local level. The selection is undertaken during a series of community meetings – at either sub-location or village level – that are led and facilitated by HSNP's administrative component. However, the community is not permitted to select all households that it believes are poor. Instead, the programme imposes a quota of households on each community which is based on the putative percentage of extremely poor in each district divided by the average number in each household.⁴ These quotas are set out in Table 1.

Table 1 Quotas of beneficiary households applied in each district by the CBT methodology⁵

Greater district	Extremely poor population (%)
Mandera	57.3%
Marsabit	67.9%
Turkana	77.2%
Wajir	51.9%

In making their decisions, communities defined criteria that were agreed in an initial meeting. In those areas where livestock ownership was less, criteria tended to focus on the demographic characteristics of households – such as the presence of orphans, people with disabilities, older people and children – with less weight being given to livestock. In those communities with greater livestock holdings, the balance is less clear on the weightings given to demographic characteristics and livestock possession. In at least one community studied, livestock possession was used as an initial filter, with demographic characteristics being applied subsequently. However, in others, it may be that the demographic criteria were still given priority.

3.2 DEPENDENCY RATIO

In Dependency Ratio locations, beneficiary households are selected based on the proportion of dependent members to able-bodied households. Dependent members are defined as: children 17 and below, elderly 55 and above and disabled 18-54 years old. In Mandera and Wajir, eligible households are defined as those with a ratio of twice or more dependents than those members able to work and in Marsabit and Turkana it is more dependents than members able to work. There is no quota on the number of households per sub-location so all eligible households are included in the programme.

3.3 SOCIAL PENSION

With the Social Pension, everyone aged 55 years and above is eligible. The National ID card is considered the primary reference document for proving age. However, if an individual does not have official documents or claims the age on the ID is incorrect,⁶ they are vetted by a community committee which is able to determine age using a calendar of events. Only those of an eligible age at the time of registration can enter the programme: anyone reaching 55 following the registration period is excluded.

⁴ See Annex 5 for more detailed information.

⁵ Source: KNBS, 2007a and KNBS, 2007b

⁶ According to OPM, this only happens if there is a 10 year discrepancy between the data on the ID and the age claimed by the beneficiary. This rule appears questionable given that even a small discrepancy could exclude someone from the benefit.

4. EFFECTIVENESS IN REACHING THE POOR

The study undertook a qualitative assessment of the opinions of a variety of stakeholders on the targeting accuracy of the different methodologies. The results, therefore, are opinions rather than hard evidence. But, all opinions were cross-checked so reflect a consensus view of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, programme staff and other stakeholders (leaders, other organisations, etc).⁷

It also needs to be recognised that, in communities where almost everyone is poor, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of targeting. Almost any method of targeting is going to be effective in reaching those who could be considered as “poor.”

4.1 COMMUNITY BASED TARGETING

CBT appears relatively effective at reaching those recognized by communities as being the poorest and most vulnerable, in other words those that communities would regard as destitute. These households often have minimal labour capacity and would be characterised as households with few possessions and larger numbers of elderly, people with disabilities, and young children. These households comprise a relatively small proportion of communities (perhaps 10-20%).

Among the rest of the community CBT acts very much as a rationing device and its effectiveness in reaching the poor is driven by the size of coverage. Since most poor – rather than extreme poor – households are relatively similar, CBT chooses some of the poor while omitting others in a relatively arbitrary manner. On another day, almost certainly a different set of poor households would have been chosen. If coverage in communities is high, more poor will be chosen and if coverage is lower, then the number will be lower.

There is a general consensus that CBT is relatively effective in excluding the non-poor, but there are few of these in most communities.

4.2 DEPENDENCY RATIO MECHANISM

The success of the Dependency Ratio mechanism in identifying the poor is related to coverage. Where coverage is high, most poor people are necessarily identified. As a result, the Dependency Ratio mechanism has probably been the most effective in reaching the poor. However, following the same logic, providing benefits to everyone in the community would have been the most effective in reaching the poor (and, in some communities, this would seem to be a sensible approach given the high levels of poverty).

The Dependency Ratio mechanism does exclude some households that are poor, but do not have the correct dependency ration. So, for example, in some communities, it was found that young mothers were excluded.

The mechanism also includes some better-off households, as long as they have the correct dependency ratio. For example, better-off households that have taken in children from poor families to care for them are in a better position to access the programme.

4.3 SOCIAL PENSION

The Social Pension is effective at reaching poor households with older people, and most households with older people appear to be poor, although it is difficult to assess how many are extremely poor. As with pensions elsewhere in the world, if the Social Pension were targeted at poor older people only, the exclusion of poor older people – and their households – would increase. However, a number of poor households with older people were excluded, in particular those who turned 55 following registration.

The main limitation of the social pension is that it does not include households that do not have older people as members. Nonetheless, it is likely that many of these households received indirect benefits

⁷ In Turkana consultations included approximately 190 people in general baraza meetings, and 45 in 9 focus group discussion. There were also discussions with 15 others individually including Administrative staff, chiefs, HAI, MoGCSD, etc. In Marsabit, there were 10 focus group discussions and 6 additional interviews. In Wajir, there were 25 focus group discussions and 6 additional interviews.

from the programme as it was recognized that older people shared their cash with their kin, in particular their grandchildren.

The social pension did include some older people who were not poor, including some who were entitled to a government pension.

5. REASONS FOR TARGETING EFFECTIVENESS

The reasons for targeting effectiveness in terms of reaching poor people can be examined by looking at challenges with both design and implementation of the targeting mechanisms. As this section will indicate, most of the challenges with the Social Pension and Dependency Ratio are in their design while the CBT is mainly affected by implementation challenges.

5.1 COMMUNITY BASED TARGETING

The CBT is targeted at the poor so, in its design, it faces few challenges in reaching its goal. Most of the errors in the CBT are introduced through implementation.

A key reason explaining the relative success of CBT in reaching poor people is its high population coverage, at least when compared to the social pension. As Section 2 explains, the higher the coverage, the more likely that a larger proportion of poor people will be covered, while also increasing the likelihood that people who are less poor will access the programme.

However, this advantage of high coverage has not been applied consistently across CBT localities. In many localities, the communities believe that the programme significantly under-estimated the local population. This was probably the result of using the 1999 census as the basis for calculating current populations. Even when a population growth rate of 2.5% per year was applied – which may not have always happened – this is often well below the real growth rate in those sub-locations that have experienced high levels of sedentarisation. Consequently, it is possible that programme coverage in some sub-locations using CBT has been as low as 15% of households. For example in a sub-location in Wajir (Kukala), there were 153 recipient households out of approximately more than 1,000 (according to community members). Low coverage by its very nature reduces the proportion of the poor population accessing the programme

In some localities it was realised that the 1999 national census data was an inadequate basis for calculating populations. In Marsabit, more realistic population figures were achieved by the administrative team initially comparing census data, village registers and relief lists to assess the accuracy of the national census data. They then conducted their own census – ‘household listing’ – to apply a quota of 68% which means that coverage rates were likely to be more accurate. As a result, more poor people will have been covered in this district

As indicated in Section 4.1, CBT appears reasonably successful in identifying those regarded by communities as the poorest and most vulnerable. This is achieved despite some community meetings having up to 500 people present.⁸ The main reason for its success is the extent and quality of the administration component’s facilitation which enables a public, open and transparent process. However, as indicated in Section 7.1, the investment of human resources in this facilitation is high compared to other CBT mechanisms worldwide. It is doubtful that the same level of success could be maintained if there was a decrease in the number or quality of the facilitators.

A key reason explaining the success of CBT facilitation in reaching the poorest and most vulnerable – perhaps 10-20% of households – is that these households are relatively easy to identify and community members find it easier to reach a consensus. They include people who are unable to work due to frailty or significant caring responsibilities and who have a completely depleted asset base. Typical households would include disabled people, older people, orphans, widows or single women with many children and no livestock.

However, CBT’s biggest challenge is in prioritising poorer households among the majority of community members who are poor but not entirely destitute or vulnerable. Any targeting methodology would find it difficult to differentiate between such households on the basis of poverty and CBT is no different. In effect, a degree of arbitrariness enters into the process. Nominations from community members tend to follow the line of the identification methodology chosen – for example, the throwing of a pen – or depend on the facilitators arbitrary selections, until the quota is filled. The process then

⁸ This would not be full representation from the community as an unknown number of households are always not present. It would have been good practice to have compared the households present with the total population in the community, as this would have allowed the programme to check on how many and who was missing, including identifying any patterns of exclusion. (In community meetings, there may also be people present from other sub-locations).

stops. The criteria become less important in identifying households as the process continues as each individual who gets to speak is asked to nominate another vulnerable or poor individual and justify their choice. Once the poorest are identified, it is much more difficult for individual community members to objectively assess the merits of one household over another. Community members together do not have the opportunity to compare the merits of one household over another in any meaningful manner. Indeed, social norms mean that contestation – which is necessary if CBT is to be more accurate – is always going to be limited.

The effectiveness of CBT relates closely to the nature of community member participation. Despite the seemingly high quality of facilitation, the nature of participation was still limited by factors beyond the control of the programme (e.g. size of the settlement and dominant cultural and religious norms). Therefore, there will be variation in targeting effectiveness along those lines under this methodology. It is worth noting that the high degree of satisfaction regarding CBT did not derive from participation of community members with regarding to contesting, amending and improving the accuracy of the list. Satisfaction stemmed from the public nature of selection (in particular the identification *baraza*) and therefore relates to the transparency of the process. It is therefore important to note that community level satisfaction does not necessarily correlate with effectiveness of the methodology.

Once a quota is reached, households that have not been lucky enough to have been nominated are excluded from the programme, even though objectively they may be more deserving than nominated households. In effect, the CBT mechanism becomes a means of rationing the distribution of a benefit that is unable to reach all of the poor. There is little to choose between many of those selected or rejected. On another day, if the pen had fallen in an alternative direction, a different group of beneficiaries may have been selected (with the exception of the clearly destitute who are likely to be chosen anyway, as a result of the good facilitation and transparent process).

The size and heterogeneity of communities appears to influence the process. Smaller communities have better knowledge of their members and may be more able to differentiate between households. In larger communities – sometimes with more than a thousand households – it was more difficult to manage meetings and the majority of people recognised that they were unable to comment on most of the community members proposed. In communities with different clans, there is more contestation on the merits of specific households. Within the same clan, people are less likely to challenge each other publicly. And, due to sharing mechanisms within clans and kinship groups, those who miss out will know they will benefit anyway from their kin included in the programme and are more likely to accept exclusion if they see their relatives benefit.

Households not present during the targeting process can be nominated. This is most likely to apply to the most infirm, immobile and destitute households. However, once the most destitute are targeted, and there is little to choose between households, there may be a bias towards households present in the community meeting.

Indeed, if households miss one meeting – especially the introductory meeting – they are likely to miss them all. Among one group of female non-beneficiaries who were interviewed, 8 out of 11 had missed the first *baraza* and then not turned up to any. Reasons for missing the first one included child birth, hospitalisation and caring responsibilities for dependants. A number were convinced that they would have been chosen if they had attended.

In some areas – particularly those with higher numbers of nomadic pastoralists – possession of livestock is used as a targeting criterion (although the exact number that should serve as a cut-off for eligibility can be hotly contested). Although livestock possession resonates with local definitions of wealth, as a criterion it suffers from imperfect information. At the time of targeting, animals may be far away and sedentary household members may not know with certainty how many animals they possess. So some households may be excluded on the basis of the number of animals they had a few months earlier, but this may not reflect their current situation.

The programme puts a lot of faith in the validation period – in which the SPR component provides support to households that are excluded – and community verification meetings, as a means of providing the opportunity for households that are unfairly excluded to appeal. However, there is little evidence that these work particularly effectively. Given the large number of households that could

appeal their exclusion on legitimate grounds, the number of appeals in this period is surprisingly small. In 2 sub-locations visited, there were only 38 appeals although there were around 1,000 beneficiaries. And, there is little evidence that verification lists have been modified to any meaningful degree.

As noted in Section 2, poverty is dynamic and CBT is unresponsive to changes in household circumstances. If re-targeting is not undertaken for three years, then many households will fall into poverty – or further into poverty – over that period, yet will not be able to access the programme. This is of particular significance in northern Kenya where asset portfolios are fragile. Over time, targeting accuracy will degrade as deserving households are locked out of the programme, while some beneficiary households experience improved circumstances yet remain on the programme. More frequent re-targeting could address this problem, but this would significantly increase costs and, potentially, increase tensions in communities.

5.2 DEPENDENCY RATIO

The Dependency Ratio mechanism's main errors in reaching the poor derive from its design although it also faces implementation challenges.

Nonetheless, the Dependency Ratio mechanism would appear to have had the greatest success in reaching the poor. But, the main reason for the success of DR in reaching most of the poor is its high coverage, rather than any merit in the methodology per se. In some sub-locations coverage was almost universal: for example in Kurgum sub-location – in Marsabit District – 74 out of 88 households were enrolled and in other sub-locations field staff estimated coverage of up to 90% of households. If the programme had enforced higher dependency ratios, less people would have been targeted and the mechanism would have necessarily reached less poor people.

The high coverage of the Dependency Ratio mechanism also makes it more likely that households that are less poor are included. Indeed, there are households that are less poor who take in children from poorer kin. Yet, despite their greater wealth, the transfer of children increases their chances of accessing the programme, while reducing the chances of the poorer household.

The main challenge with the Dependency Ratio methodology design error is the potentially weak correlation between dependency ratio and poverty, although this study is not able to assess the level of correlation that exists. So, some of those who are excluded from the programme will necessarily be poor. For example, households comprising single mothers with one child could never be targeted; in Arbaqueramso – in Wajir District – for example, many of those missing out are young women with children.

The Dependency Ratio mechanism took a particular view of dependency, using age 55 as the point at which someone becomes a dependent (presumably to align with the official retirement age, at the time of programme commencement). Yet, many 55 year olds are still active and productive, with assets, thereby weakening the correlation of the Dependency ratio used with poverty. Employing a higher age to signal dependency may have increased a correlation with poverty as older people would be more likely to be frail and less likely to contribute to the household.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that information on household members is accurate. The Dependency Ratio Mechanism should demand accurate demographic data on for example, age and disability, but there is no evidence that this information was verified (for example, vetting committees were only required to verify residence but not age). This seems inconsistent with the practice in the Social Pension in which the age of beneficiaries has to be verified. It is also unclear whether disability was robustly identified.⁹

The Dependency Ratio mechanism depends on being able to identify household structures. Yet, this raised challenges. For example, in polygamous households there is insufficient clarity on how to

⁹ It appears that respondents were asked to describe the nature of the disability, but no robust tests were undertaken. There are techniques for undertaking rapid and systematic assessments of disability, such as the Washington Group Scoring System. It asks questions on a range of areas of functioning, and will be used in the Uganda SAGE programme to identify disabled people.

include the husband, who is often defined as the head of the family unit comprising several households. Yet, this choice has implications for families. If he is allocated to only one nominated wife, a husband aged over-55 would increase her chances of entering the programme, but if under-55 it would reduce them. Yet, the nature of his relationship to any specific household is not easy to determine in a limited period of the census. Indeed, a husband could be allocated to a number of his wives or to none at all. It is also unclear how to treat children who are away from home – for example in boarding school – or even older people who may have an ambiguous relationship with a household.

Households are also not stable structures, and their composition can change relatively rapidly over time, particular among pastoralists. So, while a household may be eligible or non-eligible during the targeting period, that eligibility may change relatively soon. For example, traditional marriage practices such as the “mass marriage” that occurs among some ethnic groups – such as that reported in Kargi Location in Marsabit – can change the composition of households within and across sub-locations in a short period of time. Yet, due to the infrequency of re-targeting, there is no means of removing or including families as their circumstances change.

The Dependency Ratio mechanism is particularly prone to manipulation by families, who can change the composition of their household. At times, this has worked against households when they do not know how the mechanism works. Some households were incorrectly excluded because they brought in older children (ie. adults) to increase household numbers in the belief that a larger household would lead to a larger benefit. Yet, this increased their chances of being excluded from the programme. More common, though, has been a process of households manipulating their composition once they have become aware of the mechanisms criteria, which is discussed further in Section 12. During re-targeting, the ability of families to manipulate the mechanism will increase significantly, thereby increasing errors further.

Although the Dependency Ratio mechanism was supposed to collect accurate data on household members – such as name, date of birth, disability, and identity number – this information, when collected was not entered into the electronic database. Consequently it is very difficult to crosscheck household membership by, for example, tracking children who may have been counted in more than one household.

The Dependency Ratio mechanism tested both on-demand and census registration methodologies. Yet, it was clear to many local staff early on in implementation that the census registration methodology was the most accurate methodology and that on-demand registration made manipulation by households easier and was less appropriate for more mobile populations. Nonetheless, on-demand registration continued to be used, on the grounds that it was cheaper. A hybrid method was tested in a few sub-locations but, while this addressed the access issues for nomadic pastoralist households, it was also easier for households to manipulate compared to a census method.¹⁰

5.3 SOCIAL PENSION

The main targeting challenge with the social pension is in its design. It can only target poor households that have older people so other poor households are necessarily excluded. And, by design it also includes less poor and non-poor households. This is not perceived as a major problem since most people identify the old as deserving;¹¹ indeed, old age tends to be a priority criteria under CBT. If the inclusion of non-poor older people were perceived as a major problem, it would have been possible to exclude those with other pensions or salaries, as this is relatively easy to identify. But, the inclusion of non-poor older people is not regarded by communities as particularly problematic.

The main reason why the social pension captures less poor people than the other methods is because household coverage tends to be lower (between 20 and 30 per cent). This is a necessary function of using only one population category for targeting. If the programme had wanted coverage closer to that of CBT – while remaining as a categorical targeting programme – it would have been

¹⁰ The hybrid method was used in two locations in Turkana and one in Wajir; we are informed by the Secretariat that this was because of security concerns.

¹¹ It was noted that the emergency rations often could not be consumed by older people due to being too hard, so cash is viewed as more appropriate for them.

advisable to bring in additional categories in addition to old age. While these should only be determined after a more comprehensive study, they could include orphans, widows, single mothers, disabled, chronically ill, etc. in line with the categorical criteria frequently prioritised by CBT communities.

While the social pension component of the programme was meant to be universal, in some locations an effective quote was applied, such as Eldas sub-location in Wajir where the quotas was 585 recipients. This was because some administrative teams interpreted the old age population estimates as a benchmark to guide the numbers of recipients in sub-locations rather than a figure intended for internal planning purposes. In these cases, village elders were obliged to decide who would receive the benefit. But, by targeting only a proportion of the elderly, overall coverage was reduced and the exclusion of poor people would have increased.

One key design issue impacted negatively on the effectiveness of the social pension. Unlike normal pension schemes around the world which use a rolling registration method, the programme implemented a one-off registration. Only those who were aged 55 at the time of registration could enter the programme. The programme argues that this was because they had a fixed quota of beneficiaries in the pilot, and could not increase numbers (although this does not explain why people dying were not being replaced, which would have lead to a reduction in beneficiary numbers over time). The one-off registration had a number of implications for targeting effectiveness:

- Some people who were aged 55 but missed the registration were permanently excluded from the programme. For example, one old man in Dela sub-location in Wajir District raced back to the registration but missed it by one day, and never entered the programme. The SPR component evidently was unable to pick up his case.
- A large number of people have turned 55 since registration but have been excluded from the programme. As a result, the number of beneficiaries on the social pension is continuously reducing as people exit through death or migration, but are never replaced by new entrants.
- One-off registration has tended to bias the programme against nomads. In Dela sub-location – in Wajir – the community members were told that there was a quota of 500 but only 243 were enrolled because registration was undertaken during a difficult period and people had been obliged to travel to distant locations.¹²
- Some vetting committees appear to have responded to the one-off registration by accepting on to the programme some people who were younger than 55 at the time of registration, but would turn 55 during its implementation. This may not have happened if they had been able to assure people that they could join the programme once they turned 55.¹³

The social pension experienced a number of implementation challenges. One was in the identification of age. Some people have national ID cards that indicate they are younger than their real ages. When applying for IDs they had given a younger age to avoid being interrogated about the reasons for missing the initial dissemination of ID cards.¹⁴ This led to some people being excluded from the programme despite being the correct age; indeed, inaccurate ages on IDs was the main source of complaint recorded by the SPR component. Some vetting committees rejected people on the basis of the age on their card, rather than re-assessing their ages. Nonetheless, data from Marsabit indicates that exclusion due to ID card ages was not a significant problem.¹⁵ Overall, the vetting committees have worked reasonably well in ensuring that challenges relating to determining age are not a barrier to access.¹⁶

¹² It is also possible that the higher figure is the result of a change in administrative boundaries so that the 500 reflected the estimated number in a former larger sub-location.

¹³ Given that there is always some degree of vagueness on exact ages, this may not imply that vetting committees deliberately falsified ages but they may have been more willing to accept the upper estimate on a person's age.

¹⁴ Missing the initial dissemination of ID cards may have indicated that they were outside Kenya at the time, which may raise questions about their citizenship.

¹⁵ Of 1225 beneficiaries in 6 social pension sub-locations in Marsabit only 3% complained about having no ID (32) and only 5% complained about decisions made against them on the basis of wrong ages on their IDs (62).

¹⁶ Field staff suggested that it would be preferable to strengthen the National ID card coverage and service to correct wrong data under the National Registration department and base age verification on that system, as required under the OPCT. Recent news reports in Kenya indicate that a third generation ID

A final challenge with social pension targeting effectiveness is de-registration. There is no formal process to register deaths. Consequently, secondary recipients can continue receiving payments after the pensioner's death. There is currently no requirement for secondary recipients to demonstrate that the older person is still alive when receiving cash. Yet, in the OPCT, secondary recipients require a letter of authorisation. The OPCT also incentivizes registration by paying a bonus payment equivalent to 6 months payment, if the death is registered. This follows the practice in the Namibian pension whereby the bonus is given as a funeral benefit, to help cover the additional costs experienced by families.

card is soon to be rolled out nation wide. This may provide an opportunity to strengthen age verification techniques to strengthen accessibility to age-based entitlements in the future.

6. FURTHER CONCERNS WITH THE TARGETING PROCESS

6.1 RE-TARGETING

One challenge with the whole approach to testing different targeting mechanisms is that it has not yet been completed. In any test of targeting, it is also critically important to examine re-targeting. Once people have experience of the targeting mechanism, they may behave differently during re-targeting as they seek to maximise advantages for their families.

The need to test re-targeting is particularly important in the case of CBT. While the results of the initial targeting have been reasonably well accepted by communities – see Section 10.1 – there is no guarantee that this will be the case during re-targeting. Beneficiaries may be reluctant to give up benefits plus community members will be aware of how the mechanism works and may well seek to manipulate it to their advantage. Community members themselves are divided on how well re-targeting may function: some are confident that the same process will run smoothly while others believe that re-targeting will lead to increased social tensions. Indeed, the main message from communities is that no-one should be removed from the programme but that it should be extended to more people. A final decision on whether to adopt CBT should not be taken until the re-targeting process has been implemented and evaluated. Unfortunately, the evaluation of re-targeting has not been included in the pilot programme, which is a significant omission when a targeting methodologies are being evaluated. It would be advisable to undertake re-targeting in a representative number of locations, so that the methodology can be fully tested.

It is already evident that re-targeting will be problematic with the Dependency Ratio mechanism. Since communities have already learnt how to manipulate targeting criteria to their advantage by changing household composition, this is likely to continue during re-targeting. The only solution would be to adopt a more complex demographic targeting mechanism, such as that which is being tested in the Uganda SAGE programme.¹⁷

It could also be argued that the Social Pension methodology has not been tested properly. A single re-targeting process should not be introduced to the Social Pension. Rather, it is still necessary to test a process of rolling registration before a final judgement can be made on the effectiveness of the pension.

6.2 INADEQUATE INFORMATION ON HOUSEHOLDS

Across all mechanisms, there has been no comprehensive registration of data on household members on the electronic database. The draft operational manual only requires detailed information to be collected for the Dependency Ratio methodology, including information on household members' name, age, disability status, relationship to household recipient 1 and ID number, although, where it was collected, it was not placed onto the electronic MIS database. For CBT and the Social Pension, information is only collected on the main and nominated recipient, which includes their photograph and biometric data. So, no targeting methodology collected basic information on all household members. And, much effort was invested in using a census approach to target families with the Dependency Ratio mechanism and Social Pension, without going the additional step of systematically recording the basic information. This absence of comprehensive data on the CBT and Dependency

¹⁷ SAGE uses a system of giving scores to each household member depending on the demographic category to which they belong (around 30 in total), with positive scores to those categories that are to be prioritised and negative scores to those who are not (in effect, adults with labour capacity). These scores can be varied depending on the priority of the programme but the result is that there is significant differentiation in the scores for each household. Community members also find it much more difficult to manipulate the methodology, compared to the HSNP Dependency Ratio mechanism which is simple to understand. Currently, the 15% of households with the highest scores are registered for the programme. All household members are registered on to a comprehensive database which can be used as the basis of a range of MISs, not only the SAGE programme. They are also given birth certificates at the same time, which is a significant additional benefit from the programme. Once household registration is finished, the database can undertake targeting almost instantaneously. The mechanism builds on an existing process and commitment to household registration in Uganda. The mechanism, however, is still being tested.

Ratio households in the electronic database is a significant weakness in the implementation of the programme.

Collecting detailed household demographic data is critical for the good functioning of the Dependency Ratio mechanism. The absence of this data in the electronic database means that proper checks to reduce manipulation by households were not put in place. Children may have been included in a number of households to increase chances of accessing the programme.

The operational manual does not stipulate that household demographic data should be collected for CBT. However, this implies that CBT is afforded a lower standard of rigour than the other methodologies. It means that it is very difficult to monitor community decisions.¹⁸ In effect, communities are being trusted to make the right decisions, even when there is strong evidence from around the world that CBT can be manipulated by community members. Although HSNP transfers are financed by UK tax-payers, there is no clear line of accountability of communities to these tax-payers.¹⁹ To minimize fiduciary risk in the context of a household targeting methodology, as a minimum safeguard detailed information on members of beneficiary households should be collected so that community decisions can be monitored. Indeed, to ensure against exclusion errors, it would be good practice to obtain information on all households in the community. Of course, this will significantly increase the administrative resources required for CBT – which, as Section 7 indicates, are already high – but it should be a necessary practice given that the UK government is likely to demand greater accountability.

In the case of the Social Pension, as it is an individual benefit, there is not the same need to obtain information on household members. Few, if any, pension schemes worldwide collect this data, as it is regarded as an unnecessary expense. Nonetheless, the programme may decide that, for monitoring purposes, it may be helpful to have this data.

Indeed, there may be a public good in obtaining comprehensive information on households, which could be held on the MIS database, with every person having both unique individual and household identity numbers.²⁰ This could be used as the basis for developing MISs for other programmes in the area, as is already being attempted in both Rwanda and Uganda.²¹ It would enable a broader monitoring of all benefits that are being received by households – not just those from HSNP – and could be useful for planning purposes. Nonetheless, such an initiative is ambitious and a process would need to be put in place to up-date information on a regular basis.

6.3 SPR COMPONENT INVOLVEMENT IN TARGETING²²

Within CBT, rather than maintaining itself entirely independent from the targeting process, the SPR component has become actively involved in targeting. During the window period between initial selection and verification of the beneficiaries, the SPR component supports the process of gaining agreement within the community, often through meetings with households and leaders, involving also the holding of a rights *baraza*.²³ Yet, this should still be considered as part of the targeting process, and should remain a task of the administrative component. The SPR should only become involved

¹⁸ Even if information is collected on the reasons for the selection of each household in CBT – and it is unclear how consistent this is – the detailed demographic information should also be collected on each household. At a minimum, this would ensure that decisions by communities could be cross-checked and verified.

¹⁹ The same argument would apply if funds were provided by Kenyan tax-payers.

²⁰ Building a household register should not be confused with developing a common targeting mechanism. A comprehensive household register will enable information to be held on households and could be used as the basis for the MISs of a number of programmes, all of which have different targeting mechanisms, if so decided. A common targeting mechanism has the significant challenge of dealing with high inclusion and exclusion errors, and could mean that the majority of the poor are permanently excluded from the benefits of all poverty targeted programmes.

²¹ In Rwanda, the intention is to build a common targeting mechanism, using community based targeting. However, there is no evidence that this element of the programme will be successful as there are already concerns about the accuracy of the CBT methodology.

²² See Annex 6 for more information.

²³ The window period is officially supposed to be 14 days but is often shorter because of time constraints and need to complete registration in large sub-locations.

once targeting decisions are finalised and provide an independent avenue of appeal for aggrieved community members. In effect, the independence of the appeals system is compromised as the SPR would have to adjudicate on decisions in which it had been involved. This may well have reduced the effectiveness of the targeting process.²⁴ However, as discussed in Section 6.2, the absence of systematic information on households, does make it difficult for the SPR to adjudicate anyway (in particular due to the difficulties of comparing households with each other).

The involvement of the SPR component in the window period for the Dependency Ratio methodology and the Social Pension does not appear to be problematic as decisions on inclusion and exclusion in the programme are much more straightforward, since criteria are much simpler than with CBT.

6.4 VALIDATION MEETINGS

In practice there appears to be little added value in holding a validation meeting within CBT. As noted in Section 6.2, the clarification of targeting decisions takes place during the window period. There is no evidence that public validation meetings anywhere in the world are of much value. People are reluctant to publicly challenge the inclusion of others in programmes as this could cause social problems. This seems to be the experience in HSNP. The World Bank, in their Safety Net handbook, is sceptical about their value.²⁵

For SP and DR there is limited value in community level validation of the list since the community was not a stakeholder in targeting or making amendments to the list. This is probably why verification and enrolment implementation steps were often merged. A robust grievance mechanism is likely to be a more effective control against targeting errors than public validation meetings.

6.5 APPEALS PROCESS

In addition to the involvement of the SPR in CBT targeting, there are a number of further challenges with the appeals system which impact on targeting effectiveness across all mechanisms.

There are a limited number of days available to appeal decisions, which can disadvantage people who are absent during targeting. Furthermore, there is a tendency for people to be less likely to appeal if they have not participated in public meetings. And, many people appear to accept the initial decisions as fate, especially in Islamic areas.

Despite rights education training, it is difficult for individual community members to know the basis of any appeal against decisions made through CBT. Given that the mechanism is meant to target the poorest, presumably households should be able to appeal on the basis of their poverty, including their comparative standing *viz-a-viz* those accepted on to the programme. Yet, the programme has not indicated how the poverty of a household could be determined during an appeal. Furthermore, an effective appeals system based on poverty would cause significant challenges for CBT within a context of fixed quotas and budgets. If a household wins an appeal, how will another household be excluded to provide space? A lack of clarity on this process has led to representatives from two similar households being told to sort it out between themselves. An effective appeals system based on poverty would provide a significant challenge to CBT.

In the Dependency Ratio mechanism, in theory appeals should be easier than under CBT providing that accurate records of household composition are kept. Households, however, could claim that their household composition has changed, which, indeed, may well be correct (for example, a child may have moved in with them for legitimate reasons).

The appeal process should be simplest with the Social Pension, as appeals would only be against age, and this may explain why there are more appeals in the Social Pension compared to the other methodologies. Given that age vetting committees should not be used in the appeals process – as

²⁴ For more detail, see Annex 3.

²⁵ See: Grosh, M, del Ninno, C, Tesliuc, E & Ouerghi, A 2008, *For Protection & Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets*, Washington DC, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

they are part of the initial decision-making process – an alternative means of assessing age should be established, which is not yet in place.

7. OPERATIONAL COSTS

The operational costs of targeting mechanisms are an important factor in assessing efficacy. This section will assess the human and material resources demanded by the three mechanisms.

7.1 HUMAN RESOURCE COSTS

Field staff implement each targeting methodology within a window of two months per sub-location as stipulated in the manual, irrespective of the size of the population in the sub-location or the targeting mechanism. Yet, as would be expected, there is significant variation in the human resources required for each method.²⁶ Human resources also vary depending on the population size and accessibility within each sub-location.

Table 2 presents field staff estimates of the average length of time that it took to complete targeting in each sub-location for each method, although the figures should only be taken as indicative. However, it needs to be borne in mind that the larger the sub-location, the more time was required for targeting. Furthermore, when a census method was employed, it took more time than a desk-based method.

Table 2 Estimated number of days to complete targeting in a 'large' sub-location in each district, for each targeting method

	DR	CBT	SP
Marsabit	67	40	25
Turkana	45	26	40 ²⁷
Mandera	49	53	45
Wajir	51	31	23

In general, the Social Pension is the least labour intensive method and the Dependency Ratio the most labour intensive, although there are exceptions. In Turkana, for example, the CBT was the least labour intensive while, in Mandera, it was the most labour intensive.

The Social Pension is the least labour intensive for the simple reason that it is the simplest method and requires the least information.²⁸ However, there was a significant difference in human resource requirements between using census and desk-based methods, with the latter requiring much less investment. Indeed, there should not have been any need for using a census-based method in the Social Pension, as this is not done elsewhere in the world. Social pensions use an on-demand method, which is one of their great advantages. So, in reality, the number of days required – and, therefore, human resource requirements – should have been even lower than those indicated in Table 2. The reason that the Social Pension appears more labour intensive in Turkana compared to CBT is because the figures are based on the census method.

CBT requires more human resources than the Social Pension, indeed significantly more if the census method is discounted for the latter. It is a labour intensive targeting method and, to a large degree, this is the reason for its success to date. In large sub-locations, it can require up to 8 skilled administrative component staff to facilitate meetings, which can last up to a day. Without this number of staff, with adequate skills, the methodology would be compromised, resulting in less satisfactory results. Indeed, in Mandera and Marsabit, staff recommended that a 3 month period would allow for more effective implementation.

A key factor determining the human resource requirements for CBT is likely to be the means by which the sub-location population was estimated. In those sub-locations where the 1999 census data was used, targeting is likely to have been much quicker. In those locations where the administrative component undertook its own surveys to estimate populations CBT targeting would have been more labour intensive or, alternatively, it would have meant that other processes were squeezed, to enable

²⁶ See Annexes 3 and 4 for examples of the sequence for targeting and operational effectiveness, in terms of human resources, for Turkana.

²⁷ High figures for Turkana were due to basing estimates on census registration methodology.

²⁸ In Wajir, the average cycle took 23 days for approximately 636 beneficiaries involving 3 administrative staff. In Marsabit 3 staff (2 Admin and 1 Rights Team) took on average 22 days to cover approximately 215 beneficiaries.

deadlines to be met. However, as Section 5.1 notes, the absence of population surveys – while reducing the administrative burden – has resulted in under-estimates of coverage and many poor households missing out.

In those sub-locations where coverage was particularly low due to inaccurate population estimates, CBT could be done more quickly: clearly it is much quicker to identify 15% of a community than 50%. Therefore, if CBT had, consistently, reached its target population, human resource requirements would be higher than those indicated here.²⁹

Furthermore, CBT human resource requirements would be even higher if good practice were followed, and data was collected on all household members, either all beneficiary households or all households. It would almost certainly end up being the most labour intensive method as it would not only require an effective census – as with the Dependency Ratio Methodology – but would also have an additional series of community meetings. Furthermore, if the targeting tasks currently undertaken by the SPR component were handed over to the Administrative Component, this would further increase human resource requirements within the Administrative Component.

The Dependency Ratio methodology is the most labour intensive because data has to be collected on each household in the area. It not only used Administrative Component staff, but required the hiring of additional enumerators. Given that the figures in Table 2 include both census and desk-based methods, if only the census method were used – which is more labour intensive – then human resource requirements would be higher than those indicated. However, if the Dependency Ratio methodology had entered all the information on household members on to the database, targeting would have taken even longer.

The number of staff used for targeting varied significantly between Districts. In Marsabit and Turkana, full administrative teams of 3 and 8 field monitors respectively plus project officers and data management officers were used, irrespective of the size of sub-location and methodology. Furthermore, where applicable, 10 enumerators were hired to undertake censuses for both the Dependency Ratio and Social Pension methods.³⁰ In Mandera, only three field monitors were used. Field teams were smaller and only three enumerators were hired which could explain why estimates for the Dependency Ratio methodology exceed the 60 day implementation limit. Interestingly, within each District, there was very little variation in the staff composition for each method.

Estimates of administrative requirements should also take into account re-targeting. In both the CBT and Dependency Ratio methodologies, similar resources to those employed in initial targeting would have to be re-invested during re-targeting. The demands on administrative resources would depend on the frequency of re-targeting. It is not uncommon for re-targeting with household based methods to be undertaken every three to five years (although Rwanda is attempting to undertake re-targeting using a form of CBT every year). With the Social Pension, there would be no re-targeting. New beneficiaries would enter the programme on a continuous basis using an on-demand method, which is likely to require minimal administrative resources. Potentially, these tasks could be handled by local government staff.

In summary, therefore, it could be argued that there has not yet been a proper test of targeting. Methodologies have been implemented with insufficient reflection on human resource requirements. CBT has been implemented with the aim of achieving the best results without adequate consideration being given to whether the level of human resources – and therefore, administrative costs – is realistic and acceptable to the donor. If human resources were reduced, then the same level of targeting effectiveness could not be achieved, but that may be a fairer test. In contrast, the Social Pension has been implemented with excessive human resources.

Overall, however, it would be that the Social Pension is the method requiring the least human resources. While current practice means that CBT requires less human resource investment than the

²⁹ Of course, the size of sub-locations and population density are also factors to take into account when assessing the speed of targeting. A sub-location with few beneficiaries but geographically sparse population could take a significant time to target.

³⁰ In Turkana, four field monitors and six tour guides were used. We believe that they all acted as enumerators.

Dependency Ratio methodology, if good practice were introduced, and detailed information was recorded on households, the CBT method is likely to be the most labour intensive.

7.2 MATERIAL RESOURCES

Material resource requirements are similar across each methodology, although printing costs are higher with the census method. There should have been variations in the numbers of vehicles required to travel to communities, depending on the number of staff required to implement each method. But, similar numbers of staff were mobilised for each method, and potential savings that could have been made by using a more cost-effective on-demand method for the Social Pension were not realised. However, the Dependency Ratio methodology did require enumerators to be mobilised in addition to programme staff – some of whom were from outside the sub-location – which will have required additional vehicles to be used

Field level data collection processes are carried out using paper on most occasions, although staff in Marsabit reported using direct data entry onto laptops when sub-locations were particularly far from the District centre. Using paper is less efficient than direct entry onto electronic equipment but some field staff mentioned that they do not have the typing skills to use laptops. Battery life on laptop computers is also an issue. It is not always practical to transport generators and fuel especially for house-to-house survey work. The use of portable solar panels, similar to those used by payment agents, could help reduce costs. Laptops used in the field have a life span of approximately one year. Personal digital assistants (PDAs) may be a more appropriate option.³¹

³¹ The M&E component uses UMPC with external battery support to collect data. They are charged by generator or inverter attached to the car battery each night.

8. CONSISTENCY IN APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGIES ACROSS DISTRICTS

Overall, there is strong adherence to the operational manual across all districts, with the teams following the steps set out. There was, however, variation in the interpretation of loose guidance in the manual, especially with relation to CBT (most of which has been outlined in the sections above). For instance, in some locations the 1999 census data was used to establish populations, while in others a new survey was undertaken which led to more accurate population estimates.

All District administrative teams describe a preparatory phase involving establishing the administrative boundaries, holding introductory public meeting and undertaking social mapping process.³² These were followed by – in the case of CBT – criteria setting and then, for all methods, identification, validation and enrolment. There were some minor changes in the sequencing of the collection of identification data, with no apparent implications for targeting effectiveness. In all districts the administrative teams felt that implementation of the CBT methodology improved after the first sub-location as they became more familiar with the manual and had further developed facilitation skills.

The administrative entry point for targeting varied across the districts. In Marsabit and Turkana, after sub-location level public meetings, criteria setting meetings and subsequent *barazas* were held at the village level. In contrast, it was more common in Wajir to conduct all meetings at the sub-location level, as appropriate smaller geographical sub-units could not be identified with ease (few sub-locations were made up of a number of villages).

There was further variation under CBT in the ways that teams dealt with the quota in CBT sub-locations. In Marsabit the quota was managed discretely at village level to avoid tensions while in Wajir the quota was exceeded and selection was repeated to narrow down the list during identification. This is indicative of the challenges faced by teams in implementing a quota in contexts where there is little objective difference between poor and less poor households (due to minimal differentials in wealth and equal exposure to climate shocks and other stresses – see Section 5.1).

The actual methodology used in community meetings in CBT to identify households varied between districts, with some potentially more open to manipulation than others. Pen-throwing was used in Mandera and Wajir which was considered to be fair at the community level. However, in Mandera the pen is thrown once to begin a chain of nominations that theoretically could lead to nominations along clan lines (although there is no evidence of this occurring). In Wajir, the facilitator (or another person) threw the pen each time. And, in Marsabit and Turkana other methods were used including the facilitator deciding who should speak or individuals who had been nominated selecting other households that were similar to them.

³² See, for example, Annex 3 which sets out the targeting sequence in Turkana.

9. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CENSUS, ON-DEMAND AND HYBRID APPROACHES

As indicated in earlier sections, the census registration method was more appropriate for the Dependency Ratio methodology than desk-based registration, as it was less easy to manipulate by giving enumerators a greater chance of verifying household responses, since they visited beneficiaries' homes. A hybrid approach was piloted in a few sub-locations where desk-based registration was less effective in capturing nomadic households and those on the periphery of settlements. Field staff reported that applicants were more likely to manipulate household information.

The targeting of older people does not require a census approach. It is better to invest in good communications strategy and then rely on on-demand registration. If some elderly are immobile, their kin could inform project staff and be visited.

It needs to be borne in mind that a census approach is more expensive than on-demand targeting, requiring more human resources. An on-demand approach transfers some of the costs of registration to applicants, as they are the ones who have to travel rather than programme staff.

10. PERSPECTIVES OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS ON TARGETING METHODOLOGIES

Interviews were undertaken with community members – both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries – to assess their views on the different targeting mechanisms. The results are set out below.

10.1 COMMUNITY BASED TARGETING

The communities have already had experience of CBT, in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, known as Community Based Targeting and Distribution (CBTD). However, a different methodology is used in CBTD whereby small committees are formed in each community, mainly comprising village elders. This method is viewed as not transparent and community members are suspicious of the decisions taken.

The HSNP CBT methodology is viewed positively by community members, in particular when compared to CBTD. HSNP is communicated as a programme for the extremely poor and people see the targeting methodology as fitting well with this objective. Most people are confident that the poorest, according to their concept of poverty, are included.

The main support for the CBT methodology is derived from people's belief that it is transparent, as decisions are made in the open, not by elites as with CBTD. Women in particular are supportive since, for many, it is the first time that their opinion has been sought in a village forum. While it is uncommon for women to argue publicly about nominations in the community meetings, they do speak when asked to nominate another household. In the CBTD committees allocating humanitarian assistance there is a strong gender bias, with only one woman present. Consequently, women are more supportive than men of the HSNP CBT when compared to CBTD.

Even non-beneficiaries support the transparency of the HSNP CBT because they can see decisions being made. Nonetheless, many people feel that there are potentially significant exclusion errors, in particular among those who do not attend the community targeting meetings. A major concern is that the CBT is not responsive to shocks. Due to drought, many non-beneficiaries believe they are now eligible and, in some cases, poorer than the beneficiaries.³³ The preferred response is for the programme to increase its coverage. In general, there is no sense of any significant inclusion errors although, given the high levels of poverty, this is hardly surprising.

Even when the methodology is implemented in a way that requires people to be removed from initial lists, it does not necessarily cause opposition. In Wajir, facilitators often let the communities nominate more households than quotas allow yet, even when the number is reduced, the process does not appear to be contentious even though many of those excluded are no better-off than many beneficiaries.³⁴

To a large extent, it is the high quality and the intensity of the facilitation that ensures that CBT is accepted by communities. It is also likely that, due to kinship links and sharing networks, many of those excluded from the programme are likely to receive the benefits indirectly. And, even if people miss out, they still have the option of receiving humanitarian relief assistance, which means that exclusion from HSNP is not as dramatic as it may be if relief assistance were not available.

In areas where CBT is not used, people believe that it could not work in their village. They believe that benefits would be captured by the elites and that clan interests would bias the process. In those areas where CBT was trialled, there was often initial resistance by the elders as they lost influence over the process, compared to humanitarian distributions where they comprise the committees.

10.2 DEPENDENCY RATIO METHODOLOGY

The Dependency Ratio methodology generated most complaints during interviews, although less so in Turkana where people seemed satisfied with whichever methodology operated in their area.

³³ In Barmish sub-location in Wajir, for example, there are an estimated 1,000 households. The quota for the sub-location was 332 households. At the time of targeting, two years ago, the community assessed that there were about 200 additional eligible households. Now they think that nearly all households would be eligible.

³⁴ For example, in Kukala sub-location, the community was allowed to nominate 185 eligible households, before being told to cut back to 153.

Although coverage was high, people were concerned that many of those excluded by the Dependency Ratio methodology were poor and should have been targeted. Men tended to be more dissatisfied than women, arguing that household size was not indicative of household wealth. Indeed, in Marsabit, some argued that larger households could be less poor since they may well have been caring for children of poorer families.

In Marsabit and Wajir, there was confusion and some dissatisfaction with the practice of posting a list of households. While this was done to enable people to check the accuracy of the list of households, communities believed that it was the beneficiary list and could not understand why some people were later excluded.

There was some support for the methodology among non-beneficiaries. In Arbaqeramso sub-location in Wajir, female non-beneficiaries – who were all young mothers – were supportive as they perceived it to be fair and transparent, and could not be manipulated by elites and clan interests. While it could be assumed that their backing for the methodology may have been linked to their receiving indirect support from beneficiaries, the women themselves argued that no beneficiaries shared their transfer with them.

10.3 SOCIAL PENSION

The social pension beneficiaries are widely recognised by community members as deserving of the benefit, and the mechanism itself has widespread support as a means of reaching poor older people. Only in an urban area of Marsabit – where some elderly beneficiaries are regarded as less poor – did respondents question the inclusion of some beneficiaries. Indeed, beneficiaries believe that the methodology should be extended to elderly people in neighbouring sub-locations.

There is general agreement that giving cash to older people is a positive mechanism, as older people are more generous with their transfer than others, sharing it with both their children and their grandchildren. This has brought about a positive change in social relations both within and outside the household. The elderly are more valued within their own household and their children and grandchildren are more respectful of them. The elderly themselves feel a greater sense of self-worth as they are able to contribute to the household and community and not just be a financial burden. Many older people were unable to eat WFP maize as it is too hard and meant the household had to purchase more expensive soft food for the elderly. The HSNP transfer, therefore, has reduced the burden on the whole household as well as increasing family support for the elderly.

The main area of discontent with the social pension is that in the first community *barazas*, communities are told that the HSNP is a programme for the extremely poor, irrespective of age. Therefore, community members cannot understand why only a pension for older people – and their households – is introduced.

There has also been discontent as a result of some design and implementation issues. In terms of design issues, people do not like the absence of on-going registration. Most of the complaints about the pension are from people who were excluded but were nearly 55. It is also felt that the single registration method is biased against nomads, as they can be away from their home communities during targeting and cannot access the programme.

A number of implementation issues raised concerns. People were dissatisfied in those locations where a quota had been imposed on the number of beneficiaries. Indeed, those who had been selected received pressure from elderly non-beneficiaries – both residents and non-residents – to share their transfer. Also, there were complaints among people who had the incorrect date on their ID cards – which stated they were younger than they were – and could not get a satisfactory response from vetting committees nor from the appeal process.

Non-beneficiaries would like the pension to continue, as it benefits both their elderly relatives and, indirectly, themselves. But, they believe that a pension is not sufficient by itself and would like to see benefits extended to poor households without elderly members.

11. OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF TARGETING METHODOLOGIES

The main opportunity costs for community members are related to CBT, given that it demands that people spend 4-5 days in community meetings, which is particularly significant when members live far away from the meeting location. For example, in communities where 500 people attend all day meetings, this could mean up to 2,500 potential working days lost, a significant cost that is not taken into account in design.

It may be argued, though, that many of those attending have no work opportunities to lose. This would require a further study on livelihoods but there is undoubtedly some loss for some participants. And, this may vary according to the time of year, so there should be some thought given to when targeting should take place. CBT, however, does disrupt domestic work and child-caring practices.

12. BEHAVIOURAL CHANGES IN COMMUNITY MEMBERS

The main behavioural changes resulting from targeting have been with the Dependency Ratio mechanism. In Wajir, the coverage rate increased in successive waves of the programme roll out. The villages reached in the later stages had heard of the programme and that inclusion was dependent on the number of dependents in the household. The increase in coverage may have been the result of households manipulating household composition for their own benefit. The absence of robust data on household members in the electronic database means that it was very difficult to identify whether specific individuals were included as members of more than one household.

There were less obvious behavioural impacts with the social pension. There was some evidence of opportunistic behaviour to enter the programme but this may have been due to genuine uncertainty over age. Facilitators believe that some elderly people under the age of 55 did falsely state that they had lost IDs but this is not regarded as a significant problem. Indeed, there is a strong feeling in communities that it was very difficult for people younger than 55 to access the programme. A greater challenge may have been the non-inclusion of genuine over-55s with the wrong date of birth on their IDs.

With CBT, there appears to have been some strategising to ensure outcomes on community selection. In some areas, community members agreed that only one household of a polygamous family would be selected regardless of the poverty level of the family. This type of strategising would likely increase during re-targeting.

13. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROGRAMME COMPONENTS AND IMPACT ON CASE MANAGEMENT

Case management faces two main challenges. Yet these relate to systemic weaknesses in programme design rather than deriving from relationships between the components:

- Only a fraction of technical challenges are being picked up by the components. The SPR component – which appears underfunded – struggles to keep rights committees active with cases being picked up on an *ad hoc* basis as components make field visits.
- The resolution of cases is slow and recipients are unable to receive back payments for missed cycles. Delays are attributed to a large degree to technical challenges with the payment system.

Both of these issues are systemic weaknesses and are not derived from the quality of relationships between components. Furthermore, these challenges apply to all targeting methods and have little relevance for the choice of targeting mechanism for Phase 2 of HSNP.

14. PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN THE PROGRAMME AND LOCAL STRUCTURES

There have been no explicit partnerships with local structures in the targeting processes across the districts. Of particular significance is the weak integration of the programme with local government structures as it is delivered by mechanisms outside government, but there is some limited interaction with local government through District Steering Committees. However, chiefs and village elders have become involved in the programme since payment processes have started by responding to grievances about the customer service provided by agents and also faulty cards. In Phase 2, consideration should be given to the potential of involving local government structure – there was certainly interest from the DGSDO in this in Turkana – although this may depend on the type of targeting used.³⁵

In some cases Rights Committees have included members of other committees (such as schooling committees, relief committees etc) in the sub-location. However, in other districts Rights Committees were intentionally made up of community members with no role on another committee. In terms of sustainability, it may be more likely that those Rights Committee members who are members of other committees will continue their voluntary role because of their greater visibility within the community.

Vetting committees have overlapped with local structures. Village elders, who represent the smallest unit of the sub-location, are often members of these committees. This does not appear to have influenced the fairness of targeting and has no clear impact on the sustainability of the programme.

³⁵ Although not related to targeting, the collection of card faults and dissemination of new cards could be undertaken through the local administration and could be monitored by the SPR component. There would need to be provision to stop chiefs from also being the Equity agent in sub-locations to prevent a conflict of interests.

15. TRANSITION TO PHASE 2: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING PROCESS

In transitioning to a new – or single – targeting system, the main concern is in how to deal with those current beneficiaries who may lose out. Many – or the majority – of them will be poor and some (or many) will be eligible under the new targeting system but may miss out due to normal exclusion errors (if poverty targeting is used). Removing them immediately may raise two key challenges: it may give rise to dissatisfaction; and, it may cause problems for households who will have become accustomed to the cash transfer.

Therefore, it is recommended that the programme undertake the following:

- The next steps for HSNP – and the implications for recipients and non-recipients – should be fully explained in each sub-location.
- Households to be removed from the programme should be given early notification and guaranteed an additional six months (3 payments) of benefits to smooth any loss of income.
- All those on the Social Pension should remain on the programme permanently as they are unlikely to escape from poverty since they will progressively become frailer. Consideration could be given to migrating them over to the OPCT, in districts where this is being implemented, even if the actual transfer is managed through the HSNP. However, in this case the benefit amount should align to GoK policy for the OPCT. Some beneficiaries would continue to be younger than OPCT age criteria, but this anomaly should be accepted during the years in which the programme finalises its alignment with the OPCT criteria, as a means of reducing opposition to change.

16. FUTURE RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS IN PHASE 2

It is difficult to calculate the future resource requirements of the programme, given that the type of targeting methodology to be used has not been agreed. Nor have potential modifications to targeting mechanisms been agreed, as these could have significant implications for human resource requirements.

However, it is possible to examine in very general terms the implications of using exclusively CBT or moving to a categorical targeting mechanism such as the Social Pension.

An indication of human resource requirements can be obtained by examining current core targeting staff in each of the Districts and the proportion of sub-locations already covered. There are disagreements on when targeting commenced but we will use the HSNP Secretariat's estimate of December 2008.³⁶ Table 3 sets out information on the number of sub-locations in each District, the number and proportion of sub-locations already covered, and the number of core targeting staff in each District (this does not include additional enumerators brought in to help with the census method).

Table 3 Proportion of sub-locations targeted and number of core targeting staff in each District

District	Total No. of Sub-locations ³⁷	No. of Sub-Locations covered	Proportion of Sub-Locations covered	Core Targeting Staff ³⁸
Mandera	115	51	44%	6 ³⁹
Marsabit	68	22	32%	5
Turkana ⁴⁰	158	50	32%	10
Wajir	160	38	24%	7 ⁴¹
TOTAL	501	161	32%	28

As indicated in Table 3, 32% of Districts have been covered in a period of 2.5 years, using 28 core targeting staff. At the present rate and with present staffing, it would take 7.8 years to cover all District with no re-targeting taking place anywhere. Of course, it may be that with greater experience and focus, it may be able to undertake targeting more quickly, but reducing the period to less than 6 years would appear ambitious.

However, this is an average for all targeting methodologies, and we know that some take longer than others. Given that the Dependency Ratio mechanism requires most investment and the Social Pension the least, we can assume that, using current methodologies, it would take longer than 7.8 years to use the Dependency Ratio mechanism, and less for the Social Pension. It may be a reasonable assumption that the CBT would take around 7.8 years to cover all sub-locations.

However, clearly 7.8 years is far too long for undertaking comprehensive targeting in one relatively small region of Kenya and indicates some significant design challenges and questions. Therefore, we will examine the implications of reducing the period of time required for targeting for CBT and the Social Pension. We will not examine the Dependency Ratio mechanism as there is minimal chance that this targeting methodology will be used in Phase 2.

16.1 REDUCING TARGETING TIME FOR CBT TO A THREE-YEAR CYCLE

In calculating human resource requirements, a judgement needs to be made on the periodicity of re-targeting. Given the poverty dynamics within the region – and if the methodology were to really

³⁶ Turkana, local staff state that targeting commenced in mid-2009.

³⁷ These numbers are based on reports by field staff and are not necessarily aligned to the number in project documents because of changes in administrative boundaries. They include around 150 sub-locations that were originally excluded from the programme because of security concerns. A decision would need to be made to bring these sub-locations into the programme.

³⁸ These figures do not include the coordinator – in the case of Turkana, Marsabit and Mandera – or drivers and administrative support

³⁹ Data Management Officer and Project Officer are 2 separate roles, unlike in the other districts

⁴⁰ These figures were obtained from Turkana District. The HSNP Secretariat has a slightly lower figure of 48 Districts where targeting has been completed.

⁴¹ Data management is part of the coordinators role

function as a safety net and capture people as soon as they fall further into poverty – then re-targeting should ideally take place frequently, say every 3 to 6 months. Clearly, this is an impossible aspiration and most catch-all poverty targeted “safety nets” worldwide aim for a re-targeting cycle of every three years, though few achieve this.⁴² Therefore, estimates for the HSNP CBT human resource requirements will be based on a re-targeting cycle of three years.

We will also make a further assumption that, using the current targeting methodology, efficiencies could be introduced so that the period of implementing CBT across the four Districts could be reduced to 6 years.

On this basis, it can be estimated that CBT could be implemented in the region by doubling the current targeting core targeting staff from 28 to **56 staff**. This is evidently a very heavy human resource but reflects the fact that HSNP CBT is highly resource intensive. As noted earlier, reducing human resource inputs would impact negatively on the effectiveness of the targeting mechanism.

However, a number of important caveats need to be added:

- Calculations of current CBT human resources are based, to a degree, on very low coverage in some communities, which would have meant that targeting was undertaken more quickly than if the correct quota had been used.
- The staffing estimates are for the administrative component only. They do not include support provided by the SPR component. If the targeting roles of the SPR are assumed by the administrative component, staffing requirements will increase.
- If the CBT were carried out according to good practice, and data were collected on each household member – including non-beneficiaries – then the human resource requirements would increase significantly. Evidence indicates from both the Dependency Ratio and Social Pension components that introducing a census is very time-consuming. Yet, if CBT is to be made accountable to tax-payers, and fiduciary risk is to be minimized, a census should be introduced.
- If a more effective appeals system were to be introduced to CBT – one which would allow those who are “poor” but excluded to appeal on the basis of their poverty – the human resource requirements would be even greater.

So, if CBT were to follow good practice, it is likely that significantly more staff would be required than the 56 set out here. Introducing a census would require contracting enumerators who would effectively have to be employed on a full-time basis. Four per district would not be unreasonable – indeed more is likely – which would result in around **72 core targeting staff**. Including the SPR targeting functions would increase this number further.

The number of additional staff for an appeals system really depends on how effective the programme would like it to be. Most programmes around the world that have broad-based poverty-focused safety nets take the option of poor quality and ineffective appeals systems, recognising that dealing with high exclusion errors is highly problematic.

The other option for CBT is to retain the same number of core targeting staff (or even reduce the number). However, this would imply using a much less effective targeting mechanism – perhaps the types of committees used by CBTD – with a concomitant reduction in the effectiveness and acceptability of the methodology.

Indeed, one conclusion that could be reached is that CBT has not been properly tested during the first phase of HSNP. Potentially unrealistic staffing levels were used and, as indicated in Section 5.1, re-targeting has not yet been tested.

16.2 EXPANDING CATEGORICAL TARGETING

It is difficult to understand why HSNP targeting of the social pension was so labour intensive. For example, Nepal undertakes national annual re-targeting of its social pensions – with over one million

⁴² Oportunidades in rural Mexico – which uses a proxy means test (PMT) – has a re-targeting cycle of over five years. PATH, in Jamaica, has recently agreed to re-target every five years, again using PMT. Both aimed, initially, to re-target every three years.

recipients – using government staff in a very difficult environment and with no electronic systems in a period of less than one week (at community level).⁴³ However, government staff are present in each community.

It should be possible to introduce targeting of the social pension using much reduced staffing in a much quicker period of time. Indeed, it may be possible to use government staff in targeting, if agreements could be reached. Using a conservative assumption that, with desk-based targeting, each sub-location could be targeted in one week using two staff, it should be possible to target all sub-locations in the four Districts using current staff levels in 35 weeks.

If a target were set to undertake targeting of all four Districts in one year, then **20 staff** would be required.⁴⁴ Once initial targeting is finalised, then staffing could be reduced further as rolling targeting would be introduced. It is likely that a total of **10 staff** would be required for rolling targeting in the region.⁴⁵ In fact, it is likely that more efficiencies could be introduced to reduce this further (eg. by having greater expectations that eligible older people will travel to centres on specific days, and by making increasing use of back-dating of payments). If government staff were used, then requirements could be reduced further.

If further categories were introduced – such as widows, orphans and people with disabilities – then evidently human resource requirements would increase. However, there would be economies of scale introduced as staff would be in communities anyway for registration of the elderly. Nonetheless, more complicated verification procedures would have to be introduced. This would be most problematic for disability and this would increase human resource requirements. There would also need to be verification of categories such as widows and orphans. It is not possible to calculate the increased staffing requirements without further investigation on the potential methodologies, but it is likely that a 50 percent increase would not be unreasonable.

17. RECOMMENDATIONS ON TARGETING FOR PHASE 2

It is clear that there is a potential role for cash transfers – or social security programmes – in Northern Kenya, although there is a need to distinguish between long-term social security programmes – which

⁴³ Nepal is an anomaly in terms of pension targeting. It targets annually due to not having electronic systems in place. Most pension schemes do not undertake annual re-targeting but using a rolling targeting mechanism.

⁴⁴ This assumes that staff are given four weeks leave during the year.

⁴⁵ If each District is visited once every three months, by one member of staff, then 2,004 visits would be needed to be made. Some would require no or minimal travelling and some would require more. Assuming 200 working days per year, then around 10 staff would be required, working full-time. However, if increased requirements are placed on older people to travel to specific sub-location or District centres, staffing requirements could be reduced.

HSNP may evolve into – and short-term humanitarian transfers which may move to replace food with cash. But, as indicated in Section 2, careful consideration should be given to the implications of targeting individuals with labour capacity. The balance of support to such people should be to move them towards more independent livelihoods by enabling them to access programmes that support their productive potential. Indeed, one conclusion that can be drawn from CBT is that communities themselves feel that the most vulnerable individuals and families should be prioritised.

It is difficult to be definitive on making recommendations for targeting in Phase 2 without knowing, for example, the objectives of the programme – which may change – future resources, and potential coverage in communities. Furthermore, decisions will also depend on the level of administrative resources that donors are willing to invest in targeting. This is a critical question for CBT. If donors are willing to invest in a significant increase in targeting staff, then the current CBT methodology could be continued. However, if donors are unwilling to condone this, then a different CBT methodology will have to be used. Yet, any reduction in the number and skills of personnel will bring about a reduction in the efficacy of CBT and concomitantly reduce its effectiveness and appropriateness. The initial design of the programme should have ensured that the methodologies were tested only with realistic levels of staffing that would be acceptable to donors. On the other hand, the adoption of categorical targeting – as in an extension of the Social Pension methodology to incorporate other categories, would probably lead to a reduction in staffing.

Future targeting options are also contingent on the expansion of government social security programmes. Good practice would indicate that HSNP should, where appropriate, align itself to government programmes or ensure that it complements them. So, for example, HSNP could strengthen the government's OPCT and OVC-CT programmes, even if the cash transfers themselves do not pass through government systems as a means of minimizing fiduciary risk.

Consideration should also be given to using HSNP targeting to build additional “public goods.” For example, following the example of the DFID and Irish Aid-funded SAGE programme in Uganda, the programme could be used as a vehicle to provide everyone with identity. And, with sufficient investment in MISs – including capturing detailed demographic data on each household member – the basis could be established for monitoring of service delivery to households across the region. This could include ensuring that every household – or person – has access to a smartcard through which other services – including humanitarian assistance – could be delivered. This would be a challenge to establish but not impossible.⁴⁶ Yet, at the moment, much of the effort being invested in identifying and capturing information from households is, to a degree, being wasted. It may be costly to capture more information than currently happens, but it may end up being a worthwhile investment.

17.1 THREE FUTURE TARGETING OPTIONS

The study has identified three potential future targeting options. At this stage, they can only be set out in general terms but should form the basis for future discussions. And, of course, given that this review has not been able to access the quantitative targeting study, all conclusions should remain provisional.

Option 1: General safety net for the extreme poor

The programme could adopt the current CBT model which attempts to target the poorest community members, although in areas where poverty levels are high, it may make sense to target everyone. The proportion to be targeted would have to be determined by the programme and, to a large extent, would be driven by available resources.

While this model may remain relatively successful in reaching those regarded by communities as most “in need” – say 10-20% of households – it will, as now, continue to operate as a relatively arbitrary targeting mechanism among the less poor. Programme implementers should not convince themselves that targeting will be “accurate.” Therefore, care should be taken in adopting the same

⁴⁶ This should be given future consideration especially at a time when government is about to implement the 3rd generation National ID card. See: <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Cabinet+okays+two+crucial+new+law+Bills/-/1064/1165764/-/10g6bue/-/index.html>

targeting mechanism for other programmes focused on the poor. If it were, the danger would be that many deserving poor people would end up missing out on all programmes, and not only HSNP. There may be value in using a number of targeting approaches in the region for different programmes, to compensate for the targeting errors in each and increase the chances of poor people being included in at least one programme.⁴⁷

However, this proposal has significant implications. Either:

- There will need to be a significant increase in staff resources – as set out in Section 16 – to enable entire Districts to be covered and re-targeting to take place every three years; or,
- Savings will be made in administrative support by reducing the ratio of targeting staff to the population in sub-locations, to keep administrative costs more manageable, which will have implications for targeting efficacy and may reduce the transparency and popularity of the mechanism.

However, caution should be taken in adopting this option before re-targeting is tested in CBT.

Option 2: Categorical transfers to reach the most vulnerable families

The second option would build on the success of the Social Pension by incorporating further vulnerable categories. This would also follow the logic used by many communities who tend to prioritise vulnerable categories. However, targeting would not be done by communities but by administrative staff who would register households with verified “vulnerable” individuals.

However, if this approach were adopted, then further work would need to be done to assess which categories should be included in the programme, in addition to the elderly. But, they should follow the categories prioritised by communities so as to improve the acceptability of the programme (eg. orphans, widows, disabled, etc).

This option would also require further work to be done on payment mechanisms. Should there be one set payment per household, or could payment vary depending on the number of people regarded as being eligible for the programme?

The implications of this approach would be:

- Reduced staffing for initial targeting when compared to CBT; the extent of the reduction will depend on the categories to be covered.
- Further reduction in staffing for re-targeting as rolling-targeting is likely to be used.
- Non-poor in the selected categories will be chosen (although some could be excluded by, for example, identifying those on government salaries or in receipt of other pensions); however, by not having poverty targeting, it will increase the coverage of the poor within the selected categories.
- Poor households that do not have members within the selected categories will be excluded; further investigations are required to assess how great a problem this is, once categories are determined (or this can be one of the factors used when selecting the most appropriate categories)
- The methodology is likely to be popular as it will reflect the types of choices being made by communities under CBT.
- It could compete with or undermine government programmes, with some categories of people eligible for both programmes (although it may be possible to resolve this, in particular if MISs for different programmes could communicate with each other)
- To build acceptance among communities, it should not be presented as explicitly as a programme to target the poor (although it should do a reasonable job in “reaching” the poor, given the prevalent high levels of poverty); the categories to be targeted – and the rationale for their inclusion – should be the focus of any information campaign.

Option 3: Align with government programmes and build a “residual” safety net

⁴⁷ There is a range of other options for household targeting, include different forms of proxy test or CBT.

As government social protection programmes expand – in particular the OVC-CT, OPCT and Disability Grant – HSNP could be used as a means of strengthening these programmes and developing good practice. HSNP could be aligned to targeting those categories identified by government, but further good practice could be introduced into national programmes by using the greater administrative capabilities – and financing – of the programme. Although greater use could be made of government staff, the transfer of the cash should not pass through government systems, at least not until donors are satisfied that governments systems are sufficiently robust.

However, since these programmes are likely to leave gaps in coverage of the poor, HSNP could implement a limited poverty targeted safety net, focusing on those in extreme poverty (although the coverage would be determined by available donor budgets). This could continue to be implemented independently of government but should seek greater alignment with other transfers (such as humanitarian programmes, which may move towards cash transfers).

The implications of this option are:

- The social pension age would have to be raised, to align to the government's old age grant.
- Donors could make a significant contribution to improving good practice within government systems, with implications for the rest of Kenya.
- Donors would be seen as strengthening relations with government in a policy area that is currently given priority within the GoK.
- Government staff could be used for some targeting and registration on the categorical programmes, reducing the human resource burden on HSNP itself.

To maintain reasonable staffing requirements within HSNP, the CBT targeting mechanism would have to be modified, which will lead to a reduction in targeting accuracy and acceptability within communities.

Annex 1 The Proposed Research Methodology

Introduction

A multi-method research approach will be used for this targeting review. In line with the terms of reference, a significant emphasis will be placed on participatory research approaches to secure

qualitative data on the targeting process. After contractual engagement of Development Pathways, the methodology will be further refined and finalised through discussion with HSNP. In particular, the structure of the field work approach will be contingent on the number of communities included in each district assessment: the consultants recommend that, where possible, priority be given to collecting more data at fewer community sites, to reduce travel time between research sites and to ensure data depth for meaningful analysis.

Outputs:

The following outputs will be produced:

- A detailed methodological proposal for the Targeting review
- A report detailing findings of the review, according to the terms of reference, drawing evidence-based conclusions and making recommendations for the programme

Data sources:

- Existing programme documents and M&E data (HSNP Secretariat and partners to provide, where possible prior to arrival in-country; the extent to which evaluation information is available will influence the review)
- Reviews, studies and analysis of social protection programmes internationally and in Kenya, including the OVC cash transfer
- Reviews, studies and analysis of the socio-cultural context of the HSNP programme, including the social dynamics that interact with the programme across various communities. This will include strengthening our foundational understanding of local concepts of, for example, household/family, poverty, vulnerability, livelihoods, gender, and community dynamics and decision-making processes.
- Findings from field visit consultations through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews (collated in-country) with beneficiaries, project staff, local government, and other key stakeholders.
- Partner and coordination mappings (to be completed with HSNP field staff)
- Minutes of national feedback workshop

Assessment and analysis methods:

Desk review

- Lessons learnt from targeting methodologies in other social protection programmes internationally, including the OVC programme in Kenya.
- HSNP programme documents, including draft operational manual, administrative and monitoring data for the programme and the districts included in this review, and any relevant evaluation information.

District assessments

- Collation of programme data not previously reviewed, including reviews from “Grievance” component.
- Focus-group discussions and semi-structured in-depth interviews with: programme beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; community leaders; HSNP field staff; and other key stakeholders (partner agencies and other NGOs, government, women’s and children’s groups etc).
- Consultants will work with HSNP staff to develop partnership and coordination maps of the programme, identifying various partners and stakeholders and depicting visually the perceived strength and importance of coordination amongst them.
- Community focus group discussions to include male and female adults, young people, older people and representatives of vulnerable populations (such as people living with a disability, people living with HIV and AIDS). In discussion with HSNP and partners, we will agree on appropriate groupings of people for focus group discussions (e.g. could be disaggregated by sex, age, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries etc.) We will aim to bring similar categories of people together in one focus group as this is often conducive to more equitable participation.
- While children are critical members of the community, the consultants do not assess child participation in this particular review as being critical or significantly beneficial to children. However other consultations on the programme conducted with children will be reviewed to ensure that any relevant feedback from children on the targeting options is included.

- The composition and content of focus group discussions and in-depth interviews will be finalised with HSNP partners during briefing
- HSNP to confirm whether three communities from each district will need to be included in the review before district-level schedule templates for consultations are developed.

Qualitative comparative analysis of each targeting condition⁴⁸

- Each targeting method will be treated as a case study – the consultants will synthesise findings from each of four districts where each targeting condition has been piloted, assessing the respective strengths and weaknesses of each approach:
 - Mapping of each targeting method through all stages of the programme, and assessment of each method at all stages against key criteria.
 - Assessment of the extent to which potential errors and challenges with targeting are the result of design or implementation.
 - Analysis of economic, social, political, moral costs and opportunities and potential for maximum human, economic and social development impacts.
 - It is assumed that the accuracy of each targeting approach will be assessed through the evaluation component of the programme; data from any assessments will be useful (HSNP to confirm that there is no need to independently assess the *accuracy* of the targeting as this is not possible with a qualitative review beyond an indicative assessment). However, we will assess community perceptions of accuracy and fairness of targeting methodologies through the focus group and in-depth discussions.

National consultations

- Analysis of the overarching political, economic, administrative and social context in which programme takes place
 - HSNP staff and partners briefing
 - 1-day workshop with HSNP partners and stakeholders to review field work findings and solicit inputs prior to final report composition

Research questions:

Table 1 below identifies research questions grounded in the terms of reference for the review, identifying which of the assessment and analysis methods will contribute to each item of work required.

Table 1 Research Questions

Proposed Research Questions as per TORs	Assessment methods
What is the operational effectiveness of each of	• Desk review of programme documentation

⁴⁸ The terms of reference specify the completion of a qualitative comparative analysis of the three targeting conditions. Qualitative comparative analysis can refer to either a statistical process or to a conceptual approach to research. Statistically, qualitative comparative analysis utilises Boolean algebra to analyse small- to medium-size N (population sizes) without losing the inherent complexity of each case within the set, thus retaining the strength of case-oriented approaches but enabling statistical analysis. This process is not being recommended for this review. An N (population) of 3, such as in this review, is the smallest possible N-size that QCA can be applied to. It is a small enough number of cases that the complexity of each case can be retained through a case-study approach without performing additional statistical analysis. Rather, we are adopting the conceptual approach of qualitative comparative analysis: exploring each case (being each targeting approach) as a complex and dynamic whole and seeking to develop the comparative components of the analysis through the same participatory framework that is utilised for the data collection.

Proposed Research Questions as per TORs	Assessment methods
the three targeting methodologies, Community Based Targeting, Dependency Ratio and Social Pensions in the following aspects: human resources costs; time frames; logistics; machinery & equipment implications; and other relevant aspects?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultations with HSNP field staff • Consultations with relevant stakeholders • Mapping of processes and stages of each targeting methodology, and an assessment of strengths and weaknesses at each stage.
To what extent are the targeting manual guidelines for methodology applied in practice in the target districts? What are the implications of deviation for operational effectiveness?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholder and beneficiary consultations • Mapping of processes of each targeting methodology • Site visit to programme registration points to observe process • Consultations with HSNP staff
What do target populations and other stakeholders think about the targeting processes and methodologies? What opportunity costs have different types of beneficiaries encountered during the targeting process and what are their views of these?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community consultations (focus groups, key informants) • Focus group discussions and key informant interviews
Do the three targeting methodologies raise similar operational challenges in different geographical areas? Are the methodologies applicable uniformly in urban, peri-urban and rural locations? If not, which method can be applied where? <i>In addition, we suggest examining whether multiple methods can be applied in one location</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community consultations (focus groups, key informants) • Review of programme data • Consultations with HSNP staff • Consultations with other relevant stakeholders
How effective and efficient are the three targeting methodologies operationally? How effectively does each methodology target the chronically poor and vulnerable and how do the methods compare in terms of being operationally feasible? What challenges and difficulties do each methodology encounter in reaching the poor?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review of programme documentation and international lessons learnt, including from Grievance component • Assessment of costs of each method • Consultations with HSNP field staff • Community consultations (focus groups, key informants) • Focus group discussion with key stakeholders working with vulnerable groups (ie out-of-home care providers, child protection focal points, CSOs)
Is there evidence of any behavioural changes (positive and negative) in communities/households to make sure that they are included in the HSNP programme? For example, are households bringing in more members (young and elderly) or cheating so as to benefit from SP/DR targeting? Are there adaptive behaviour for other methodologies? <i>We suggest examining whether those in decision-making positions in selection processes – but outside the project staff - are manipulating the process.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community consultations (focus groups, key informants) • Consultations with HSNP field staff • Qualitative comparative analysis • Analysis of administrative data • Consultations with stakeholders working with the young and elderly
What are the human resources (quantity and capacity levels) required to implement Phase II of the HSNP? What are the basic minimum qualifications and experience requirements for the different levels and disciplines?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Community consultations (focus groups, key informants) • Consultations with HSNP field staff • Qualitative comparative analysis

Proposed Research Questions as per TORs	Assessment methods
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review and modification of existing HSNP job descriptions if already existing Assessment of potential roles required in Phase II
<p>What, if any, is the relationship between programme coordination among different programme components and the number of case management issues reported? <i>We suggest additionally examining the relationship between programme coordination and the manner in which cases are managed and resolved.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partner and coordination mapping exercise with HSNP field staff Consultations with staff from different programme components Community consultations (focus groups, key informants) Findings correlated against # reported case management issues (sourced from programme data records in each district)
<p>What are the operational strengths, weaknesses and constraints of using hybrid, census or on-demand targeting approaches? What recommendations can be made to inform other similar social protection programmes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desk review Review of international experience Community consultations Consultations with HSNP field staff Qualitative comparative analysis
<p>Do programme staff and users recognise the difference between community-based targeting and Community Based Targeting and Distribution (CBTD) used in food aid programmes? Have community leaders been trained in the difference? What is their understanding of this difference?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community consultations Consultations with HSNP field staff and other stakeholders
<p>What local structures have partnered with the programme in targeting? How do these new partnerships impact on the future sustainability of the programme? What impact have these partnerships had on the perceived effectiveness and fairness of targeting?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partner and coordination mapping exercise with HSNP field staff Consultations with HSNP field staff Consultations with relevant "local structures"
<p>What needs to be put (or kept) in place regarding retargeting, programme exit and graduation criteria to ensure a smooth graduation to Phase II of the programme?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Synthesis of findings drawn from all data sources, including community perceptions on the future of the programme,

Logistics

We have put together an ambitious agenda for the research to 1) reduce costs and 2) produce rapid but high quality results. The success of the research will be dependent on HSNP partners providing the research team with adequate logistical support to move to and from the Turkana region and between districts. If there are any problems with the timetable set out, it will be important that HSNP advise us immediately so as to make modifications before booking flights.

Inputs

The inputs from each team member are set out in Table 2. The team comprises three experienced field researchers – Mr. Cosgrove (CC), Ms. Hannigan (LH) and Ms. McPherson (AM) – who are experts in social protection and social research and have a good knowledge of targeting issues. They will be involved in all phases of the research programme. Dr. Kidd (SK) – again an experienced researcher with significant experience in social protection and targeting – will provide oversight and quality control to the research. He will be involved in research design, analysis of the results, the workshop with HSNP staff, and write-up of the report, as well as providing a synthesis of international experience on targeting.

Table 2 Inputs by team members

INPUTS	AM	LH	CC	SK	Other	Total
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Preparation for fieldwork; refinement of research methodology; etc	2	2	2	1	0	7
Inputs in Kenya (fieldwork, meetings, workshop)	20	11	12	3	0	46
Writing of first draft of main report	4	2	2	2	0	10
Revisions to main report to produce final version	1	0	0	1	0	2
Logistical support	0	0	0	0	5	5
Total	27	15	16	7	5	70

Timetable

The proposed timetable for the research is set out in Table 3. We plan to commence the research in the week of 25th April, with Ms. McPherson and Mr. Cosgrove having initial meetings with HSNP and collecting data held in Nairobi on Friday 29th April. The team will travel to the field on the weekend of 30 April and 1st May and field research will begin on 2nd May and continue until 13th May, with Ms. Hannigan arriving on 6th May and undertaking fieldwork in week of 5th May.

Dr. Kidd will arrive in Kenya to discuss the research findings with the research team on 15th and 16th of May. We plan to have a one-day workshop with stakeholders on 17th May.

The draft report will be ready by 3rd June and, providing HSNP can provide us with comments by 10th June, we will produce a final report by 15th June.

Table 3 Review timetable

	Responsible person	April 25	May 2	May 9	May 16	May 23	May 30	Jun 6	Jun 13
Literature review of HSNP material; refinement of methodology	AM, LH, CC & SK	26-28							
Briefing with HSNP: Oxfam, HelpAge, Secretariat	AM, CC	29							
Travel to Turkana (Districts 1 and 2)	AM, CC	30-1							
Fieldwork District 1 and 2	AM, CC		2-6						
Travel to District 3 and 4	AM, LH		7-8						
Fieldwork District 3 and 4	AM, LH			9-13					
Travel to Nairobi	AM, LH			14					
Arrival in Nairobi	SK			14					
Meeting of research team	AM, LH, CC SK			15-16					
Workshop with stakeholders	AM, LH, CC SK				17				
Report writing and delivery of draft (by 29 th)	AM, LH, CC SK				18-3				
Comments by HSNP on draft report	HSNP						4-10		

Finalisation of report	AM, LH, CC SK							11-15
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Annex 2: Consultation Record

Annex 3: Targeting Sequence in Turkana

I. Sequence for Targeting Approach - relevant to all methods: Turkana			
Targeting process	Task	Time frame per task	Staffing Requirement
1. Managing Consultants meetings		7 days reqd	Project Officer, Drought Management Officer, DSG Officers, MPs? Equity Bank, HAI Staff, M&E Component
2. Prepare Plans			Project Officer, Data Management Officer, Field Monitors.
3. Leaders Meetings			Project Officer, Field Monitors, Chief, Cllrs, DO, DC.
4. Community Mobilisation		3-4 days reqd	Project Officer, Field Monitors, Asst Chief, opinion leaders.
5. Community Meeting/Training I	first meeting (Rights Committees formed)	1 day reqd for smaller S/L; 2-4 days reqd for vast S/Ls	Field Monitors x 2, Driver (HAI staff for Rights work)
	FGD/Social Mapping		Field Monitors x 8, Pro Officer, Driver.
6. Community Meeting/Training II	Feedback FGD	1 day reqd for smaller S/L; 2-4 days reqd for vast S/Ls	Field Monitors x 2, Driver
	Criteria setting		Field Monitors x 8, Pro Officer, Driver.
	Registration date setting		
6 (ii) Community Meeting III(1)	(as above)	2-4 days reqd.	Field Monitors x 2, Driver
Coordination	District Level	25% staff time (3)	Prog Coordinator, Dep Coordinator, Food Security & Livelihood Officer
	Nairobi Level	30% staff time (3)	Food Security & Livelihoods Adv., Grants Administrator, ASAL Coordinator
Support Staff		30% staff time (3)	Oxfams support staff % - Logistics Officer, Human Resource Officer, Accountant, Security Guards x 2.
Case Management (2)		6 days per month	Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field Monitors x 2
(1) Only if attendance by the community is poor for first two community meetings is a third meeting convened; (2) Estimated average time spent on task per month, varies with targeting method; (3) HNSP budget allocation to Oxfams' core staff			

Annex 4: Operational Effectiveness in Turkana

Operational Effectiveness of Targeting Methods -Turkana District						
Information based on example of 1000 House Hold cases						
Targeting Method / Sequence	Activity/Task	Human resources costs	Time frames	Critical Factors		
				Logistics	Machinery & equipment implications	Other relevant aspects, ie. Value for Money
Community Based Targeting	Card Distribution			Driver		Nairobi staff provide support
The sequence for Targeting consistent with all methods						
The sequence for Targeting consistent with all methods		Processes stages	1-6 (refer to I. Sequence for Targeting Approach)			Refer to /
11. Card Distribution	List postings	Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8, store keeper, Proj Officer, Field	1-6 (refer to I. Sequence for Targeting Approach) 2-4 days reqd	Driver	Truck, vehicle, stationery, vehicle, fuel	Refer to /
7. Registration - Paper registration	Window period	Proj Officer, Data Man, Field Officer Monitors x 8, Data Man	2 days reqd	Driver	vehicle, laptops, vehicle, fuel devices	these days refer only to District based staff time. Fewer recorded
12. Case Management		Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8, Data Man	4 days reqd	Driver	stationery, vehicle, fuel	case for CBT & DR compared to SP
8. Validation Meeting		Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8, Data Man	4 days reqd	Driver	stationery, vehicle, fuel	case for CBT & DR compared to SP
Dependency Ratio						
9. Enrolment	List postings	Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8, Data Man Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field	2-3 days reqd	Driver	vehicles, generator, 4 laptops, additional camera & stationery, stand, Finger print device, extension cables,	Refer to CBT above. Three additional Field Monitors reqd for this task
		Proj Officer, Data Man			stationery, fuel	More back office days
	Nairobi Administration period	Officer, Field Grants Administrator Monitors x 8	4-6 days reqd	Driver	vehicle, fuel	required for calculating HH threshold for Targeting
8. Confirmation of list	This task specific to DR targeting method	Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8	1 day reqd	Driver	Vehicles, laptops, additional computer	Additional allocation of staff reqd: 9 Field resources
	District Level	Data Man	4 days reqd	Driver	batteries, stationery,	Training in new software for Proj Officer, Data Man
9. Enrolment		Officer, Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field Monitors x 8	3-6 days reqd	Driver	vehicle, fuel stationery, vehicle, fuel	Additional software for Proj Officer, Data Man Threshold

						calculation
10. Submission	Nairobi Administration	Grants Administrator	4 days reqd			Refer to <i>1. Sequence for Targeting Approach</i> for allocation of staff resources
	District Level	Data Man Officer, Proj Officer	4 days reqd	Driver		Training in new software for Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field Monitors
11. Card Distribution	Card Distribution	Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8, store keeper, tally clerk	2-4 days reqd	Driver	Truck, vehicle, stationery	Nairobi staff provide support function. Refer to <i>1. Sequence for Targeting Approach</i> for allocation of staff resources
	Goody Bag Distribution			Warehouse storage		
12. Case Management		Proj Officer, Data Man Officer	2 days reqd	Driver	vehicle, laptops, memory devices	Fewer recorded case for CBT & DR compared to SP
13. Census Approach	This task only relates to DR & SP targeting methods	Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field Monitors x 8	10-14 days reqd	Driver	Vehicles, laptops, memory devices, additional stationery, additional computer batteries.	Additional Staff sub-contracted: 3-4 Field Monitors, 6 tour guides for local vilages; Extra hardship for staff , travel long distances, food , water provisions to be carried. DR information on threshold is based on different communities, not pro-poor,

13. Census Approach	This task only relates to DR & SP targeting methods	Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field Monitors x 8	10-14 days reqd	Driver	Vehicles, laptops, memory devices, additional stationery, additional computer batteries.	Additional Staff sub-contracted: 3-4 Field Monitors, 6 tour guides for local vilages; Extra hardship for staff , travel long distances, food , water provisions to be carried. DR information on threshold is based on different communities, not pro-poor, single parent HHs below 55 with no disability do not qualify.
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Social Pensions

7. Registration - Paper registration	List postings	Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8, Data Man Officer	1 day reqd	Driver	stationery, vehicle, fuel	
	Window period	Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 8, Data Man Officer	4 days reqd	Driver	stationery, vehicle, fuel	
8. Validation Meeting		Proj Officer, Field Monitors x 4	4 days reqd	Driver	stationery, vehicle, fuel	more days are required covering larger S/Ls
9. Census Approach	This task only relates to DR & SP targeting methods	Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field Monitors x 8	7-10 days reqd	Driver	Vehicles, laptops, memory devices, additional stationery,	Additional Staff sub-contracted: 3-4 Field Monitors, 6 tour guides for local vilages; Extra hardship for staff , travel long distances,

11. Submission	Nairobi Administration	Grants Administrator	4 days reqd			
	District Level	Data Man Officer, Proj Officer	4 days reqd	Driver	stationery, vehicle, fuel	
12. Card Distribution	Card Distribution	Proj Officer, Field	2-4 days reqd	Driver	Truck, vehicle, stationery	
	Goody Bag Distribution	Monitors x 8, store keeper, tally clerk		Warehouse storage		
13. Case Management		Proj Officer, Data Man Officer, Field Monitors x 2	4-6 days reqd	Driver	vehicle, laptops, memory devices	More days are required covering HHS unable to attend Barazas

Annex 5: Detail on how quotas were applied differently between districts

The manual states that the quota should be announced as part of the key messages in the introductory baraza. After announcing the quota at sub-location level, field teams in Marsabit which implemented CBT at the village level considered the quota at sub-location level but did not necessarily evenly distribute the quota between villages. During Identification barazas they would announce when the village had almost filled its quota to encourage scrutiny over the remaining households but could withhold some places that could be used to absorb any missed households identified by the SPR component during the window period. Marsabit field teams felt this was effective as sub-location quotas do not necessarily apply at village level – and they observed that poverty is dynamic and within sub-locations and villages don't have consistent poverty levels. They also felt that this enabled them to avoid/minimise tensions and problematic situations whereby a household on the list needs to be identified to be replaced by an excluded eligible household.

The discrete management of quotas at village level appears to have been a successful strategy in Marsabit to avoid tensions. The decision making by the field team highlights the delicate operating context and the potential social costs of CBT at the local level.

In Wajir, quotas were also managed both in the interest of minimising impact on social relations but also in attempt to achieve agreement that those included were the extreme poor. Facilitators allowed the quota to be exhausted during identification barazas. For example, where there was a quota of around 150 households, they allowed the community to exceed this (though this was not exhaustive). Field teams did this in part as a strategy to cope with the often very low quotas that were established for relatively large settlements and avoid complaints. Also, they could then refine the list at the baraza and ensure people present were happy with those included.

The implications are that this prolongs an already extensive process at the community level. There is also possibility for confusion when some names are then removed. In Wajir, people wrongly removed from the list are unlikely to complain because of dominant Islamic beliefs and because of the subjectivity in differences between households.

Annex 6: Detail on the role of SPR in Community based targeting

Across the districts the role of the SPR component in the targeting process was not clear cut. Theoretically they provide an independent avenue to appeal against decisions made in the community meetings. In practice, the window period was not always used just for identifying complainants but also for resolving grievances.

The challenge stems from the difficulty faced by community members who want to appeal. Whilst people may feel aggrieved because they see themselves as eligible, they're often unable to be specific about how they exactly meet the criteria (and less able to compare themselves to the characteristics of included households). As SPR component or RCs help clarify the nature of the appeal they are often drawn into a process of examining their eligibility against the criteria and making comparisons to included households. The admin component – who facilitated community validation after each household was nominated – then needs to address the appeal. However, rather than taking the case back to the validation baraza for public amendment, in more than one district, resolution and changes to the list occurred during the window period and not in the community baraza. Lack of data on how each included households met the criteria poses as significant challenge to facilitators and if taken back to the community there is a risk that a whole new selection of households would be identified.

Lack of household data and records of how each household meets the criteria makes public amendment of the list problematic. Any changes in the membership of the validation and amendment public meetings creates space for alternative perspectives and view points make it hard to finalise amendments and create a definitive list. Field staff suggested that it was more feasible to resolve complaints about exclusion during the window period and utilise the validation baraza to 'report back' on final changes to the list.